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INTRODUCTION
Civil forfeiture is a truly extraordinary legal doctrine—so much so that
those who find themselves subject to a forfeiture proceeding frequently
express disbelief that such an action could exist in the United States.1 The
Kafkaesque civil forfeiture system is ancient, labyrinthine, and impermeable
to the uninitiated. Despite its esoteric nature, federal, state, and local
1

See infra note 290 and accompanying text.
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authorities commonly utilize this legal doctrine. While the practice once
had reputable roots, it has become a tool with enormous potential for abuse.
This Comment explores the doctrine of civil forfeiture at a macro level
before suggesting some specific recommendations for reform.
I begin by briefly examining the history of civil forfeiture. Forfeiture has
its origins in biblical text and was present in English law as early as the
tenth century. Rapidly appearing via statute in the United States, it was
used as a tool against smugglers, confederate sympathizers, and liquor
runners during Prohibition. The practice grew increasingly common in the
1980s, as legislatures realized forfeiture could prove a potent weapon in the
war on drugs. As such, forfeiture use has since expanded dramatically;
today, the value of property forfeited annually stands in the billions of
dollars.2
The historical underpinnings of civil forfeiture continue to be relevant
because they help clarify what forfeiture is. Essentially, forfeiture is an
action filed directly against property, rather than against an individual. It
depends on the central notion that property can be guilty per se. Forfeiture
actions, then, proceed against the property itself. The property owner, who
is reduced to a third party claimant, lacks many constitutional protections
that would otherwise be available in a criminal action.3
Nationwide, civil forfeiture laws are a complex, multilayered landscape
of federal and state statutes. The federal forfeiture statute—the Civil Asset
Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA)4—stands as the dominant federal paradigm, although it interacts with other federal laws, like customs statutes,
that provide for forfeiture. Simultaneously, forty-nine states—all except
North Carolina—allow civil forfeiture. Law enforcement officers pursuing a
seizure of property have a number of options; for instance, federal “equitable
sharing” guidelines allow officers in a state with a more restrictive statute to
bypass state guidelines and access more favorable federal forfeiture proceedings.
Critically, many of these statutes—most notably CAFRA—allow law
enforcement to keep the proceeds of forfeiture actions. Although the
revenue raised by forfeiture has proved vital to reinforcing sagging law
enforcement budgets in difficult economic times, such provisions also
increase the threat of abuse. The resulting revenue, combined with a lower
burden of proof than in criminal prosecutions, incentivizes law enforcement
2 See infra note 32 and accompanying text (citing several articles that detail the high aggregate value of the property seized).
3 See infra note 140-141 and accompanying text (noting that double jeopardy applies to people
but not property).
4
Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (2000).

870

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 867

to use civil forfeiture as a tool to seize and dispose off individual property
for its own ends.
This Comment addresses the problems associated with civil forfeiture in
a very specific context: mid value chattel (MVC) and low value chattel
(LVC) forfeiture. This should not suggest that forfeiture against real
property (RP) or high value chattel (HVC), defined here as chattel with a
value greater than $10,000, is not problematic. Rather, MVC and LVC
forfeiture pose several unique problems.
The major issue that MVC and LVC seizure creates is that it is simply
not economically rational for most individuals to defend an action against
such chattel, given the relatively high cost of doing so. Standard attorneys’
retainers in forfeiture actions can be upwards of $10,000—an amount that
may be several times greater than the value of the chattel itself.5 Indeed,
data reveal that approximately eighty percent of forfeitures are uncontested.6
Moreover, it is not readily apparent that the seizure of MVC and LVC—
often involving small, personal belongings, such as phones or sneakers—is
particularly effective at stopping pernicious drug traffickers. Finally, the
Constitution, which provides some due process protections for the deprivation of real property via forfeiture, does not afford analogous protection to
MVC and LVC.
Many other proposed solutions to the problems of civil forfeiture fall
short of providing a framework to protect MVC and LVC. First, law
enforcement officers, prosecutors, and their lobbies oppose any limitation on
forfeiture. Second, some legal commentators have argued for extending
constitutional protections to forfeiture. MVC and LVC, however, pose
unique problems for any ex post constitutional protections. The major
problem, of course, is that the majority of such actions are uncontested. As
such, courts simply do not consider any constitutional protections because it
is not economically rational for individuals to litigate a defense in the first
place.
Even if the advanced constitutional protections of the Fifth or Eighth
Amendments merited consideration, they would fail to provide much help to
MVC and LVC claimants. For example, although the Eighth Amendment’s
excessive fines clause can overturn certain forfeitures, which in the language

5 See infra note 112 and accompanying text (referencing a forfeiture case involving property of
very low monetary value).
6 See infra note 106 and accompanying text (providing uncontested rates for forfeiture cases
generally and for drug cases specifically).
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of CAFRA are “grossly disproportional,”7 MVC and LVC are frequently of
such little value that this provision does not provide sufficient protection.
The most serious suggestion—and one not disparaged here—is the
abolition of the profit motive in forfeiture. This Comment, however,
cautions against viewing such an approach as a panacea that would cure all
the ills of forfeiture. First, there is evidence that forfeiture can be a tool of
racial oppression.8 Merely abolishing monetary profit from forfeiture might not
therefore dissuade officers from engaging in forfeiture to harass minorities.9
Furthermore, abolishing the profit motive might discourage officers from
undertaking the forfeitures that “matter”—i.e., pursuing valuable proceeds
or instrumentalities of the drug trade, such as the massive property owned
by Pablo Escobar, seized in Florida during the 1980s.10 Forfeitures of such
properties are likely to be complicated and dangerous, and police should be
rewarded for pursuing them. Finally, totally stripping the profit system
from forfeiture might cripple police budgets, which, particularly in our
current economic milieu, rely on forfeiture proceeds.11
In light of these issues, I propose a new approach to civil forfeiture
reform. I argue that forfeiture should be seen as a transaction—one that
transfers rights in property from the claimant to the seizing department. As
such, different costs can affect the “market” for forfeiture. Within this
framework, I suggest increasing the transaction costs of forfeiture and
requiring police departments to internalize the externalities they impose on
non-consenting parties (i.e., owners) in these actions. The idea, in essence,
is to change the ex ante incentive structure to protect MVC and LVC from
entering a system where defense is simply not economically rational.
Increasing transaction costs—by requiring heightened procedural formality
or by forcing immediate probable cause hearings for plaintiffs—would make
police discount the value of any seized property against the costs of its
seizure, with the hope that MVC and LVC will simply no longer be worth
the effort.
This Comment proceeds in five parts. In part I, I examine the history of
forfeiture, beginning in Exodus and continuing through medieval England.
I track the development of forfeiture law in the United States, before
examining its initial deployment in the war against drugs in the early 1980s.
I then discuss the vociferous criticism of forfeiture in the 1990s, which
7 18 U.S.C. § 983(g)(3) (2012).
8 See infra notes 233-238 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 233-238 and accompanying text.
10 See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 239-242 and accompanying text.
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eventually led to the passage of CAFRA, the federal forfeiture act in place
today.
In Part II, I turn to the statutory framework, examining CAFRA,
followed by the particular forfeiture statutes of three states: North Carolina,
Alaska, and Florida. Last, I look briefly at the intersection of federal and
state law in the context of the doctrine of federal equitable sharing.
After this general discussion of forfeiture, in Part III I narrow my focus
to the aforementioned problem of MVC and LVC. I examine in detail the
issues facing MVC and LVC, and explain why these two categories of
chattel pose unique difficulties for any sort of protective framework. I also
detail specific instances of abuse of MVC and LVC forfeiture.
In Part IV, I turn to four proposed solutions for resolving forfeiture
abuses (1) retaining the forfeiture status quo without reform, (2) expanding
constitutional defenses, (3) stripping the profit motive from forfeiture, and
(4) abolishing forfeiture entirely. I detail the advantages and disadvantages of
these provisions, both generally and in the specific context of MVC and LVC.
Finally, in Part V, I turn to my proposal: the transactional approach.
First, I advance the idea of forfeiture as a transaction, specifically within the
Calabresi–Melamed framework of rights transfer. Establishing forfeiture as
transactional in nature, I then discuss three economic concepts that should
inform forfeiture reform ideas: transaction costs, externalities, and “nudges.”
I conclude by applying these concepts in the form of six proposed solutions.
I. THE HISTORY OF CIVIL FORFEITURE
Although this Comment largely focuses on the use and abuse of civil
forfeiture in the twenty-first century, it is still worthwhile to turn to the
ancient—indeed, biblical—roots of the practice. This historical detour
proves germane to the discussion, as the unique development of civil
forfeiture as legal fiction continues to resonate in modern Supreme Court
opinions on the subject.12

12 See, e.g., Various Items of Personal Prop. v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931) (“It is
the property which is proceeded against, and, by resort to a legal fiction, held guilty.”); Todd
Barnet, Legal Fiction and Forfeiture: An Historical Analysis of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 40
DUQ. L. REV. 77, 94 (2001) (discussing the use of civil forfeiture as legal fiction to evade
constitutional protections).
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A. The Ancient Roots of the Practice
The core conceit of civil forfeiture, that objects can be “guilty,” stems
from Exodus: “When an ox gores a man or a woman to death, the ox shall
be stoned, and its flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox shall not
be liable.”13
The concept acquired additional substance in Medieval England, where
it evolved into an action called deodand. Deodand—a transformation of an
earlier action called noxal surrender, which involved surrendering property
to the wronged party, rather than to the state—developed in the tenth
century laws of Alfred the Great, and reflected a mixture of biblical ideas
and Anglo-Saxon wergild traditions.14 Deodand required the surrender,
directly to the Crown, of an object that had caused the death of a king’s
subject.15
Deodand became a source of revenue for the Crown before its eventual
excision from the English common law in the early nineteenth century.16
This form of forfeiture did not make its way into early U.S. common law. In
fact, forfeiture laws, like the infamous “writs of assistance” that British
13 Exodus 21:28; see also Alan Nicgorski, The Continuing Saga of Civil Forfeiture, the “War on
Drugs,” and the Constitution: Determining the Constitutional Excessiveness of Civil Forfeitures, 91 NW.
U. L. REV. 374, 378 (1996) (“[C]ivil forfeiture’s origins can be traced back as far as the Book of
Exodus.”); Evan Williford, The Basics of Forfeiture: Testing the Limits of Constitutionality, 14 CRIM.
JUST., Winter 2000, at 26, 27 (noting the biblical origins of forfeiture and quoting the same
passage from Exodus).
14 See generally Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands,
Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169, 181 (1973)
(“The Laws of Alfred the Great were prefaced by a translation of chapters 21-22 of the Book of
Exodus, and Christian—i.e., biblical—moral notions permeate much of the statement of the laws
proper, even if the substance of the rules themselves may be thought to be largely pre-Christian in
origin. It may nevertheless be conceded that the rule in Alfred, Ch. 13 . . . is a fair reflection of an
early and widespread usage designated as the ‘noxal surrender.’” (footnote omitted)); Anna
Pervukhin, Deodands: A Study in the Creation of Common Law Rules, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 237,
241 (2005) (discussing the still mysterious transition from the practice of noxal surrender to
deodand after the Norman conquest).
15 See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 (1974) (“The value
of the instrument was forfeited to the King, in the belief that the King would provide the money
for Masses to be said for the good of the dead man’s soul, or insure that the deodand was put to
charitable uses.”); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 34 (Law Book Exch.,
Ltd. 2005) (1881) (tracing the evolution of deodand to the intrinsic desire to retaliate against the
inanimate object itself ) ; Scott A. Hauert, Comment, An Examination of the Nature, Scope, and
Extent of Statutory Civil Forfeiture, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 159, 163-64 (1994) (positing that
deodand served a “revenue function” for the Crown).
16 See Pervukhin, supra note 14, at 249 (describing how railroads, under intense pressure from
a series of sky-high deodand judgments, eventually lobbied to have the practice abolished in 1849);
Hauert, supra note 15, at 164-66 (tracking the evolution of deodand as a revenue producer for the
Crown to its eventual end in the early nineteenth century).
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customs agents enforced, were a major grievance of the Colonies and
contributed to sparking the American Revolution.17 Consequently, the
Constitution explicitly bans forfeiture of estate.18
B. Uses Throughout American History
Although common law forfeiture was not part of the U.S. tradition,
statutory forfeiture achieved recognition as legitimate and played a role
through the first two centuries of the republic.
Early uses of civil forfeiture in the United States reflected the balance
between controversies raised by estate forfeiture and the necessary revenue
and enforcement goals of forfeiture actions. Many early forfeiture statutes,
derived from the British Navigation Acts passed in the seventeenth century,
targeted smugglers.19 A series of early Supreme Court cases upheld
Congress’s authority to pass such statutes, distinguishing common law
forfeiture from statutory forfeiture.20 These forfeiture acts were justified as
necessary, as it was often easier for customs officials to seize smuggled

17 See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682 (“Deodands did not become part of the common-law
tradition of this country.”); Hauert, supra note 15, at 165 (“The repugnancy of deodands resulted in
our Founding Fathers rejecting the institution as part of American common law.”); see also M.H.
SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE 251-56 (1979) (describing how the vitriolic response to the
writs of assistance led to the passage of the Fourth Amendment).
18 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 (“[N]o Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of
Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.”).
19 See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §§ 12, 36, 1 Stat. 29, 39, 47-48 (allowing the federal government to seize and civilly confiscate property for failure to pay duties on imports), repealed by Act
of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 74, 1 Stat. 145, 178; Penhallow v. Doane’s Adm’rs, 3 U.S. 53, 54-56 (1795)
(citing Resolution of November 25, 1775, enacted by the Continental Congress, which provided for
the forfeiture of vessels and their cargoes used to supply British forces); MARIAN R. WILLIAMS
ET AL., INST. FOR JUSTICE, POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 10 (2010) (“American forfeiture law did not arise strictly from [deodand] but rather from the
British Navigation Acts of the mid-17th century.”). For an in-depth look at the Navigation Acts,
see Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Civil Forfeiture and the War on Drugs: Lessons from
Economics and History, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79, 95-96 (1996).
20 The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1 (1827), is perhaps the most cited of these cases. There, Justice Story,
writing for the majority, explained the justification for statutory (as opposed to common law) civil
forfeiture as allowing a proceeding directly against the property since “[t]he thing is here
primarily considered as the offender.” Id. at 14.
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property than to apprehend the smugglers themselves.21 However, these
early uses of forfeiture were limited to enforcing admiralty jurisdiction.22
These cases laid the legal foundation of forfeiture. However, the doctrine
long remained dormant in the American legal landscape, emerging only
briefly during the Civil War as the Confiscation Acts, which allowed for the
seizure of property belonging to those who aided the rebellion.23 Similarly,
government agents employed forfeiture to seize the profits and possessions
of liquor smugglers during Prohibition.24 Under the National Prohibition
Act,25 conveyances of intoxicating liquors were subject to forfeiture.26 The
Act facilitated the seizure of automobiles belonging to liquor smugglers, as
in United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile.27
C. The Drug War and the Expansion of Forfeiture
The use of forfeiture exploded with the onset of the drug war. The passage of the Comprehensive Drug Control Act (CDCA)28 in the early 1970s
marked the first instance in which the government used civil forfeiture as a
tool to combat drug trafficking. Calero-Toledo, a seminal forfeiture case from

21 See Susan R. Klein, Civil In Rem Forfeiture and Double Jeopardy, 82 IOWA L. REV. 183, 191
(1996) (discussing the early use of civil forfeiture to pursue privateers and smugglers); Sarah
Stillman, Taken, NEW YORKER, Aug. 12, 2013, at 49, 52 (“It was easier to prosecute a vessel and
seize its cargo than to try to prosecute its owner, who might be an ocean away.”).
22 See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 19, at 10 (“The Supreme Court held that civil forfeiture
was closely tied to the practical necessities of enforcing admiralty, piracy and customs laws.”);
Klein, supra note 21, at 191 (“These forfeiture provisions applied primarily to two categories of
items traveling on the high seas.”).
23 E.g., An Act to Suppress Insurrection, to Punish Treason and Rebellion, to Seize and
Confiscate the Property of Rebels, and for Other Purposes, ch. 195, 12 Stat. 589 (1862); An Act to
Confiscate Property for Insurrectionary Purposes, ch. 60, 12 Stat. 319 (1861).
24 See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 19, at 11 (briefly discussing the use of forfeiture against
the tools of liquor smuggling); Nicgorski, supra note 13, at 381 (describing the brief use of
forfeiture during Prohibition); Brent Skorup, Ensuring Eighth Amendment Protection From Excessive
Fines in Civil Asset Forfeiture Cases, 22 GEO. MASON. U. C.R. L.J. 427, 433 (2012) (“When
Prohibition began in the first half of the twentieth century, use of civil forfeiture reemerged and
was expanded to combat criminal bootlegging networks.”).
25 National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305, 317 (1919) (repealed 1933).
26 See Brant C. Hadaway, Comment, Executive Privateers: A Discussion on Why the Civil Asset
Forfeiture Reform Act Will Not Significantly Reform the Practice of Forfeiture, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 81,
91 (2000) (discussing the use of the National Prohibition Act in expanding forfeiture during
Prohibition).
27 272 U.S. 321 (1926).
28 Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2012));
see also Nicgorski, supra note 13, at 375-76 (discussing the early use of civil forfeiture in the drug
war).
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this period, still provides much of the backbone supporting the modern
understanding of and justification for the doctrine.29
Forfeiture truly came to the fore with the passage of the 1984 Comprehensive Crime Control Act,30 which permitted law enforcement to use forfeited
funds.31 The resulting revenue gains have been staggering: in 2012 the
government seized $4.2 billion in property and has enjoyed other notable
achievements, such as the seizure of real estate properties from Latin
American drug kingpins.32
In spite of the trumpeted successes of civil forfeiture, stories of abuse
began to trickle into the national media. Federal officials killed reclusive
millionaire Donald Scott when he resisted arrest during a raid on his ranch
in search of marijuana plants, which, if found, would have allowed for the
seizure of his property.33 Willie Jones, a Tennessee man, had $9600 in
cash—which he had accumulated to purchase shrubbery for his business—
confiscated for no reason other than that drug dogs alerted authorities to
the presence of trace drug residue on his cash.34 Mr. Jones’s case so alarmed

29 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686 (1974) (“But whether the
reason for [the forfeiture] be artificial or real, it is too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial
jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced.” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
30 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 853 (2012)).
31 See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 19, at 12 (describing the new profit incentive in the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act); Stillman, supra note 21, at 53 (noting that forfeiture remained
an “infrequent resort” until the passage of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act). The Act
allowed for broad uses of forfeited funds. See 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1)(F)(i) (2012) (allowing the use
of forfeited funds to equip “law enforcement functions of any Government-owned or leased vessel,
vehicle, or aircraft available for official use by any Federal agency participating in the Fund”).
32 See Stillman, supra note 21, at 53 (“Last year, the department took in nearly $4.2 billion in
forfeitures, a record. . . . The federal government seized a four-hundred-acre Montana ranch tied
to the Colombian drug kingpin Pablo Escobar, and laid claim to the bank accounts of assorted
Wall Street con men.”); Jean Thompson, $20 Million in Property Seized, MIAMI SUN-SENTINEL
(Dec. 1, 1987), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1987-12-01/news/8702080899_1_kellner-cocaineproperty, archived at http://perma.cc/NTZ6-8B9B (describing the seizure of over $20 million in
properties from the Escobar cocaine cartel, including a “$480,910 bayfront mansion in a Miami
Beach neighborhood; a $1.9 million, 45-unit apartment complex on a Biscayne Bay island in
Miami; a $442,000, three-bedroom Bal Harbour condominium; and a ranch near Ocala”).
33 See Eric Blumenson & Eva S. Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden Economic
Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 74-75 (1998) (detailing the raid and shooting of Scott); Stillman,
supra note 21, at 53 (describing Donald Scott’s death).
34 See Jones v. DEA, 819 F. Supp. 698, 706-07 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (detailing the basic facts of
the case and invalidating the forfeiture because almost all U.S. currency contains trace amounts of
narcotics); Williford, supra note 13, at 27 (describing the arrest of Mr. Jones).
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Representative Henry Hyde that he brought Jones to testify before
Congress during the passage of CAFRA.35
Moreover, three seminal Supreme Court cases from the 1990s showed the
limitations of constitutional protections against abuses of civil forfeiture,
sparking cries for reform. The first, Bennis v. Michigan, turned on the forfeiture of a car in a prostitution sting.36 Mrs. Bennis claimed that although her
husband had been using the car to solicit prostitutes, she—as an innocent
owner—should not have to forfeit her interest in the car.37 Unfortunately, the
Court ruled against Mrs. Bennis, holding that there was no innocent owner
defense absent statutory intervention.38
In United States v. Ursery, a man growing marijuana on his property
contended that its seizure, conducted after a prosecution against him,
violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.39 The Court disagreed, ruling that a
civil in rem forfeiture action is not punitive, and therefore not violative of
the Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment.40
Finally, in United States v. Bajakajian, the Court addressed the “excessive
fines” issue.41 Bajakajian secretly attempted to take $357,144 out of the
United States in violation of customs reporting requirements.42 Although
the government sought forfeiture of the entire sum, the Court did not
permit it, finding the seizure of the entire amount disproportionate to the
conduct authorizing its forfeiture.43

35 Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1916 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
104th Cong. 12-14 (1996) (statement of Willie Jones) (describing to Congress how the Drug
Enforcement Administration seized his cash and expressing his frustration at how easily an
“innocent person can get caught up” in forfeiture).
36 516 U.S. 442, 443 (1996).
37 Id. at 444 (“Petitioner defended against the abatement of her interest in the car on the
ground that, when she entrusted her husband to use the car, she did not know that he would use it
to violate Michigan’s indecency law.”).
38 Id. at 454 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“As detailed in the Court’s opinion and the cases cited
therein, forfeiture of property without proof of the owner’s wrongdoing, merely because it was
‘used’ in or was an ‘instrumentality’ of crime has been permitted in England and this country, both
before and after the adoption of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”).
39 518 U.S. 267, 273 (1995).
40 Id. at 270-71 (“[C]ivil forfeitures . . . do not constitute ‘punishment’ for purposes of the
Double Jeopardy Clause.”).
41 524 U.S. 321 (1998). For a more thorough discussion of the excessive fines issue, see infra
notes 160-171 and accompanying text.
42 524 U.S. at 324-25.
43 Id. at 339-40 (“Comparing the gravity of respondent’s crime with the $357,144 forfeiture
the Government seeks, we conclude that such a forfeiture would be grossly disproportional to the
gravity of his offense. It is larger than the $5,000 fine imposed by the District Court by many orders
of magnitude, and it bears no articulable correlation to any injury suffered by the Government.”).
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These cases, particularly Bennis, and the widely reported abuses of civil
forfeiture eventually ratcheted up pressure on Congress to enact major
reform. This reform materialized as CAFRA, the dominant paradigm of
civil forfeiture today. 44
II. FORFEITURE LAW TODAY
A. The National Landscape
Nowadays, forfeiture remains an intricate system, not merely due to
the complexity of CAFRA, but also because of the interlocking nexuses
between state and multiple aspects of federal law. Thus, we must briefly
explore how federal forfeiture works, how state forfeiture works, and, finally,
the intersection between these two sets of laws.
1. Federal Law
Federal forfeiture laws are extremely complicated. As one scholar has
suggested, “CAFRA does not replace, but is superimposed upon, the
existing procedures in the customs laws, the Supplemental Rules, and the
forfeiture statutes themselves.”45
a. CAFRA
CAFRA is the natural starting point for discussing the national forfeiture landscape. CAFRA reformed several of the most troubling aspects of
forfeiture, as fleshed out in courts during the 1990s. For instance, CAFRA
explicitly provides for an innocent owner defense, responding to concerns
Bennis invoked.46 Similarly, § 983(g) implements the ruling in Bajakajian
and requires proportionality in forfeiture.47
Other critical changes relate to the burden of proof. CAFRA increased
the level of proof necessary for forfeiture, requiring the government to

44
45

See Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (2000) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2012)).
Stefan D. Cassella, The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000: Expanded Government
Forfeiture Authority and Strict Deadlines Imposed on All Parties, 27 J. LEGIS. 97, 103 (2001).
46 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1) (2012) (“An innocent owner’s interest in property shall not be forfeited under any civil forfeiture statute. The claimant shall have the burden of proving that the
claimant is an innocent owner by a preponderance of the evidence.”).
47 Id. § 983(g)(4) (“If the court finds that the forfeiture is grossly disproportional to the
offense it shall reduce or eliminate the forfeiture as necessary to avoid a violation of the Excessive
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution.”).
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prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is subject to
forfeiture.48
Finally, some of the provisions are aimed at reducing litigation hardships
to claimants. Section 983(b)(1)(A) allows for indigent claimants—in
narrow circumstances—to receive court-appointed counsel.49 Similarly,
§ 983(f)(1)(C) provides for the release of property during proceedings to a
claimant who can show that government retention of the property will cause
“undue hardship” to the claimant.50
b. Customs Rules and Other Federal Laws
While CAFRA provides the dominant framework for federal forfeiture,
it does not stand alone. Rather, it interacts with a complex set of other
provisions and statutes that provide for specific forfeiture for various federal
offenses. This can prove extremely complicated:
For example, 19 U.S.C. § 1615 says the burden of proof is on the property
owner in any civil forfeiture case brought under a statute incorporating the
customs laws. Section 981(d) still incorporates the customs laws and § 1615
has not been amended; but § 983(c) says the burden of proof is on the government in any case brought under any “civil forfeiture statute,” as that
term is defined in § 983(i). Which statute applies when a civil forfeiture
action is filed under § 981? Because § 983(c) is inconsistent with the customs provision on this issue, it overrides § 1615 and the burden of proof is
on the government.51

48 Id. § 983(c)(1) (“In a suit or action brought under any civil forfeiture statute for the civil
forfeiture of any property, the burden of proof is on the Government to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is subject to forfeiture.”); see also 13 FED. PROC., L. ED.
§ 35:773 (“Under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA), in a suit or action brought
under any civil forfeiture statute for the civil forfeiture of any property, the burden of proof is on
the government to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is subject to
forfeiture.” (citation omitted)).
49 18 U.S.C. § 983(b)(1)(A) (“If a person with standing to contest the forfeiture of property in
a judicial civil forfeiture proceeding under a civil forfeiture statute is financially unable to obtain
representation by counsel, and the person is represented by counsel appointed under section 3006A of
this title in connection with a related criminal case, the court may authorize counsel to represent that
person with respect to the claim.”). Counsel is also available should the claimant be faced with the
forfeiture of his or her primary residence. Id. § 983(b)(2)(A).
50 Id. § 983(f)(1)(C) (“A claimant under subsection (a) is entitled to immediate release of
seized property if the continued possession by the Government pending the final disposition of
forfeiture proceedings will cause substantial hardship to the claimant, such as preventing the
functioning of a business, preventing an individual from working, or leaving an individual
homeless.”).
51 Cassella, supra note 45, at 103 (citations omitted).

880

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 867

Outside of the customs context, CAFRA interacts with a host of other
obscure federal forfeiture provisions. For instance, CAFRA applies to
forfeiture carried out by the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration.52 However, § 983(i)
carves out specific forfeiture proceedings to which CAFRA does not apply
including, for example, customs forfeiture generally.53 Straightforward
application of CAFRA is confused here because, despite the general exclusion of customs rules from CAFRA, some statutes enforced by U.S.
Customs and Border Protection—for example, currency reporting statutes—
are nevertheless subject to its dictates.54
2. State Law
In addition to federal law, different states’ laws also include unique
forfeiture provisions. Some relevant axes of comparison include the
standard of proof for seizure, which party bears the burden in the innocent
owner defense, the amount of time prosecutors have to file forfeiture
actions after seizures, and the amount of value that may be retained by the
seizing department. Below, I examine the representative cases of North
Carolina, Alaska, and Florida.
a. North Carolina
North Carolina has no state civil forfeiture in rem action.55 Property
owners must be convicted of a crime before being forced to forfeit property.56
North Carolina’s lack of a civil forfeiture statute earned it an “A” from the

52
53

Id. at 103-04 (detailing forfeiture provisions with which CAFRA interacts).
18 U.S.C. § 983(i) (“In this section, the term ‘civil forfeiture statute’ (1) means any provision of Federal law providing for the forfeiture of property other than as a sentence imposed upon
conviction of a criminal offense; and (2) does not include (A) the Tariff Act of 1930 or any other
provision of law codified in title 19; (B) the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; (C) the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 301 et seq.); (D) the Trading with the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C.
App. 1 et seq.) or the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) (50 U.S.C. 1701 et
seq.); or (E) section 1 of title VI of the Act of June 15, 1917 (40 Stat. 233; 22 U.S.C. 401).”); see also
Cassella, supra note 45, at 104 (listing civil forfeitures exempted under CAFRA).
54 Cassella, supra note 45, at 104.
55 N.C. GEN. STAT. A NN. §§ 90–112 (West 2013).
56 See State v. Hill, 570 S.E.2d 768, 769 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (“It is important to note that
our forfeiture provisions operate in personam and that forfeiture normally follows conviction.”);
State v. Johnson, 478 S.E.2d 16, 25 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (“G.S. § 90-112(a)(2) is a criminal, or in
personam, forfeiture statute, as opposed to a civil or in rem, forfeiture statute.”).
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Institute for Justice (IJ) in its state rankings.57 However, despite the lack of
state forfeiture proceedings, North Carolina police still make use of federal
equitable sharing. 58
b. Alaska
Alaska, by contrast, earned one of the IJ’s lowest grades, an “F,” for its
state civil forfeiture statute.59 Alaska’s statute causes several major problems
for property owners. First, property can be forfeited for probable cause.60
Second, the innocent owner bears the burden of proof in that defense.61
Finally, property owners must move quickly, as the statute affords only
thirty days to contest the seizure.62
The Alaska statute also creates problematic incentives for law enforcement.
First, the statute allows law enforcement to keep a high percentage of
profits that result from forfeiture.63 Moreover, there is no legal requirement
to track forfeiture data in the state, meaning that it is almost impossible to
collect systematic data on the level of forfeiture occurring in Alaska.64 As
such, knowing that there is no system of public accountability or oversight,
police have every incentive to seize as much property as possible.

57 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 19, at 80. The IJ embarked on a massive survey of state civil
forfeiture practice in 2010. In the study, the IJ ranked the states on both the quality of the state’s
own civil forfeiture laws and its abuse of equitable sharing. Id. at 41-42. The results were troubling:
twenty-two states scored a “D” or lower on the IJ test and the highest overall grade received was
Maine’s “A-.” Id. at 43-44.
58 The state’s extensive use of equitable sharing pulled down its final grade to a “C+”. Id. at 8.
For a discussion of federal equitable sharing, see infra subsection II.A.3.
59 Id. at 46.
60 ALASKA STAT. § 17.30.114(a) (2013).
61 Id. § 17.30.110(4)(A) (“[A] conveyance may not be forfeited under this paragraph if the
owner of the conveyance establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, at a hearing before the
court as the trier of fact, that use of the conveyance in violation of this chapter or AS 11.71 was
committed by another person and that the owner was neither a consenting party nor privy to the
violation.”); see also State v. Rice, 626 P.2d 104, 113-14 (Alaska 1981) (finding that substantive due
process concerns mandate an innocent owner defense).
62 ALASKA STAT. § 17.30.116(b).
63 Id. § 17.30.112(c) (“When forfeiting property under (a) of this section, a court may award
to a municipal law enforcement agency that participated in the arrest or conviction of the
defendant, the seizure of property, or the identification of property for seizure, (1) the property if
the property is worth $5,000 or less and is not money or some other thing that is divisible, or (2)
up to 75 percent of the property or the value of the property if the property is worth more than
$5,000 or is money or some other thing that is divisible.”).
64 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 19, at 46.
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c. Florida
Finally, Florida, which earned a “D+” in the IJ rankings, is an interesting
middle ground between the two extremes of North Carolina and Alaska.65
Florida law increases protections for property owners in some instances,
while simultaneously undercutting rights in others.
Florida raises the burden of proof for the government, allowing forfeiture
only upon a showing of “clear and convincing evidence.”66 Moreover, the
government bears the burden of proof in an innocent owner defense.67
Finally, the Florida statute has an explicit policy objective of vindicating
property rights.68
However, Florida allows only twenty days for the property owner to
contest the forfeiture action—fewer than even Alaska.69 More troubling is
the fact that Florida law enforcement retains eighty percent or higher of
forfeiture proceeds, creating problematic incentives.70 The short window for
65
66
67

Id. at 53.
FLA. STAT. § 932.704(8) (2011).
Id. § 932.704(6)(a) (“Property may not be forfeited under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act unless the seizing agency establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the owner
either knew, or should have known after a reasonable inquiry, that the property was being
employed or was likely to be employed in criminal activity.”). But see Gomez v. Village of
Pinecrest, 41 So. 3d 180, 188 (Fla. 2010) (distinguishing “seizure” from “forfeiture” and finding
that, at the seizure stage, the seizing agency need only establish “probable cause that the property
was used in violation of the Act”).
68 FLA. STAT. § 932.704(1) (“It is the policy of this state that law enforcement agencies shall
utilize the provisions of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act to deter and prevent the continued
use of contraband articles for criminal purposes while protecting the proprietary interests of
innocent owners and lienholders and to authorize such law enforcement agencies to use the
proceeds collected under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act as supplemental funding for
authorized purposes. The potential for obtaining revenues from forfeitures must not override
fundamental considerations such as public safety, the safety of law enforcement officers, or the
investigation and prosecution of criminal activity. It is also the policy of this state that law
enforcement agencies ensure that, in all seizures made under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture
Act, their officers adhere to federal and state constitutional limitations regarding an individual’s
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, including, but not limited to, the illegal
use of stops based on a pretext, coercive-consent searches, or a search based solely upon an
individual’s race or ethnicity.”). Florida courts take this policy statement quite seriously. See, e.g.,
Sheriff of Seminole Cnty. v. Oliver, 59 So. 3d 232, 234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (reading the
policy portion of the statute to disallow the forfeiture of checks the sheriff knew were stolen from
an innocent owner, even though forfeited checks technically met the definition of “contraband
articles”).
69 Compare FLA. STAT. § 932.704(5)(c), with ALASKA STAT. § 17.30.116(b) (2013).
70 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 19, at 53 (discussing Florida’s IJ ranking); Jefferson E. Holcomb et al., Civil Asset Forfeiture, Equitable Sharing, and Policing for Profit in the United States, 39 J.
CRIM. JUST. 273, 277 tbl.1 (2011) (showing the percentage of forfeiture proceeds that may be used
by law enforcement in different states).
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contesting seizure, combined with high profit retention, incentivizes police
to seize as much property as possible, knowing that most of the value will
revert to their departments.71
3. The Interrelation: Equitable Sharing
Equitable sharing is the final element of the national forfeiture landscape.
Equitable sharing gives state officers the ability to access favorable federal
forfeiture statutes, thereby bypassing restrictive state statutes.72
Under the doctrine of equitable sharing, any state or local law enforcement
agency that directly participates in an investigation or prosecution resulting
in a federal forfeiture may request an equitable share of the net proceeds of
the forfeiture.73 Two paths lie open to agencies seeking to participate in
equitable sharing: joint investigation or adoption.74
The joint investigation path is far less controversial. In a joint investigation, local or state (or even foreign) agencies cooperating with or working
alongside federal officials can share in a split of the proceeds.75
Adoption is much more controversial. Adoption allows a local law
enforcement agency that has seized property to turn the property over to
federal officials.76 When the seized property passes the necessary monetary
thresholds and also violates federal law—as is often the case with drug
laws—federal officials will step in and proceed with the forfeiture under
federal law.77
71 For a more thorough discussion of the perverse profit incentive, see infra notes 219-244 and
accompanying text.
72 See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 33, at 51-56 (agreeing that equitable sharing incentivizes police to bypass more restrictive state statutes); Holcomb et al., supra note 70, at 274-75
(describing the motivations to bypass state law via equitable sharing); Kyla Dunn, Reining in
Forfeiture: Common Sense Reform in the War on Drugs, FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/shows/drugs/special/forfeiture.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3QQT-RFUB (last
visited Jan. 16, 2015) (“[P]olice are circumventing their own state law in order to continue reaping
the financial rewards of civil asset forfeiture.”).
73 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, G UIDE TO EQUITABLE SHARING FOR S TATE AND LOCAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 3 (2009) (outlining which nonfederal agencies are eligible for
equitable sharing).
74 Id. at 6.
75 Id.
76 Id.; see also Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 33, at 51 (“The equitable sharing program
includes a ‘federal adoption’ procedure, whereby state police who turn seized assets over to the
Justice Department for ‘federal forfeiture’ receive back up to 80 percent of the assets’ value, to be
used exclusively for law enforcement purposes.”).
77 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 73, at 6 (outlining the requirements for federal adoption of a state or local seizure); see also Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 33, at 51 n.64 (“Seizures
accomplished exclusively by state or local agencies may be ‘adopted’ by the federal government
whenever the conduct giving rise to the seizure is in violation of federal law.”).
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Adoption is a much more dubious policy than joint investigation because
it allows state and local officials to circumvent stricter state requirements
regarding forfeiture by substituting more relaxed federal standards.78 For
instance, states with stringent homestead exemptions may find that equitable
sharing evades these protections, as a state homestead exemption is not a
defense under federal law.79
Moreover, adoption requires that the recipient agency “benefit directly
from the sharing.”80 Thus, agencies thwart state laws prohibiting police from
retaining a share of the proceeds from civil forfeiture, as officers may receive
funds from federal coffers. Indeed, empirical studies have backed up
anecdotal evidence that state officers are likely to resort to equitable sharing
to evade stricter state rules, particularly with regard to distribution of
profits.81
Immediately before this article’s publication, outgoing Attorney General
Eric Holder took steps to constrain the Equitable Sharing Program.82

78 See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 33, at 51 n.64; Holcomb et al., supra note 70, at 274
(“In effect, adoptive forfeitures allow state and local law enforcement to circumvent their own state
laws and utilize federal law for processing forfeitures.”); Stillman, supra note 21, at 58 (detailing
some of the abuses of equitable sharing).
79 See DEE EDGEWORTH, ASSET FORFEITURE: P RACTICE AND P ROCEDURE IN S TATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS 248 (2008) (“A state homestead exemption is not a defense to a federal real
property forfeiture case because the federal supremacy clause preempts the state exemption . . . .
Therefore, in jurisdictions with state homestead exemptions, law enforcement will use the federal
forfeiture system for any real property that may be exempted under state law.”).
80 U.S. DEP’T OF J USTICE, supra note 73, at 22.
81 Holcomb et al., supra note 70 at 282 (demonstrating empirically that law enforcement
agencies tend to resort to equitable sharing to receive a more generous portion of the proceeds
from forfeiture). Academics have observed that, “when state laws make forfeiture more difficult
and less rewarding, agencies are even more apt to turn to the federal government’s easier and more
generous forfeiture procedures.” Id. The Holcomb study supports numerous unsystematic pieces
of evidence that suggests state officials manipulate equitable sharing programs to their economic
advantage. See, e.g., Stillman, supra note 21, at 58 (“In Bal Harbour, Florida . . . a small vice squad
ran a forfeiture network that brought in nearly fifty million dollars in just three years . . . . [M]uch
of it had already been spent: on luxury-car rentals and first-class plane tickets to pursue
stings . . . ; on a hundred-thousand-dollar police boat; and on a twenty-one-thousand-dollar drugprevention beach party.”). But see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 73, at 35-37 (providing a list
of acceptable uses for equitable sharing funds, including “establish[ing] a detoxification center”).
82
David Post, Rule of Law 1, Outrageous Police Power 0: Eric Holder Limits Asset-Seizure “Equitable Sharing” Program, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 17, 2015), http://washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/17/rule-of-law-1-outrageous-police-power-0-eric-holder-limits-assetseizure-equitable-sharing-program, archived at http://perma.cc/C3PK-4CK2; see also Rober
O’Harrow, Jr., Sari Horwitz & Steven Rich, Holder Limits Seized-Asset Sharing Process That Split
Billions with Local, State Police, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2015), http://washingtonpost.com/
investigations/holder-ends-seized-asset-sharing-process-that-split-billions-with-local-state-police/
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Specifically, Holder dramatically pared back the adoption process discussed
above, limiting adoption to “property that directly relates to public safety
concerns, including firearms, ammunition, explosives, and property associated
with child pornography.”83 While Holder’s action is a step in the right
direction, critics rightly point out that potential for abuse still exists.84 For
instance, police departments can still form joint task forces with federal
officials to seize assets.85 Hundreds of such task forces already exist around
the country.86 It is also unclear how long-lasting Holder’s unilateral action
on the process will be. Nevertheless, it is still a step in the right direction
towards reforming civil forfeiture.
B. Arguments for Robust Civil Forfeiture Laws
This convoluted system of laws has led to dramatic results in practice.
Many proponents of civil forfeiture are quick to point out its benefits: crime
control, increased drug arrests, and a steady stream of money for otherwise
cash-strapped police departments.87
A Justice Department memorandum cites several of the concrete benefits
of forfeiture. For instance, the practice can be employed to seize electronics
used to distribute child pornography or to shut down large marijuana
farms.88 Police can also repurpose the instrumentalities of crime. Dramatically,
in Tulsa, Oklahoma, “cops drive a Cadillac Escalade stenciled with the

2015/01/16/0e7ca058-99d4-11e4-bcfb-059ec7a93ddc_story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/6G76GXR3.
83
Jacob Sullum, Despite Holder’s Forfeiture Reform, Cops Still Have a License to Steal, FORBES
(Jan. 22, 2015, 4:04 p.m.), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobsullum/2015/01/22/despite-holdersforfeiture-reform-cops-still-have-a-license-to-steal, archived at http://perma.cc/UT9x-GRKV
(quoting Prohibition on Certain Federal Adoptions of Seizures by State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, Attn’y Gen. Order (Jan. 16, 2015), available at http://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/01/16/attorney_general_order_prohibiting_
adoptions.pdf).
84
See id. (noting that the order “did not put an end to civil forfeiture”).
85

86

Id.

Id.
See John L. Worrall, Asset Forfeiture, PROBLEM-ORIENTED GUIDES FOR POLICE RESPONSE GUIDES SERIES, No. 7, at 2 (2008) (“Though it is an enforcement tool, asset forfeiture
can assist in the budgeting realm by helping to offset the costs associated with fighting crime.”).
88 See generally Stefan D. Cassella, Overview of Asset Forfeiture Law in the United States, 17 S.
AFR. J. CRIM. J UST. 347, 347, 360-62 (2004) (citing some concrete benefits of civil forfeiture,
including “[s]hut[ting] down the ‘crack house’”); Worrall, supra note 87, at 21-25 (providing some
concrete examples of problems solved by forfeiture, including street racing and prostitution).
87
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words ‘THIS USED TO BE A DRUG DEALER’S CAR, NOW IT’S
OURS!’”89
Outside of seizing the direct instrumentalities of crime, civil forfeiture
provides other related benefits. For instance, forfeiture strips criminals of
their lavish lifestyles, sending the message that “crime doesn’t pay.”90 This
separates the profit motive from crime. Moreover, forfeiture allows for the
seizure of assets that can be used to establish a recovery fund for victims,91
as demonstrated recently in the aftermath of the Madoff scam.92
From a macro perspective, civil forfeiture has resulted in a massive level
of asset seizures: the overall federal fund currently stands at $4.2 billion.93
Other stories of success abound. For example, Deutsche Bank forfeited
$403.8 million in late September 2011 as part of a settlement for allowing
fraudulent tax shelters.94 The U.S. Marshal’s website provides a listing of all
properties currently for sale, including the house once used by the infamous
Russian spies captured in 2010.95

89
90

Stillman, supra note 21, at 50.
See Cassella, supra note 88, at 348 (“Taking the criminals’ toys away . . . sends a signal to
the community that the benefits of a life of crime are illusory and temporary at best.”); Worrall,
supra note 87, at 13 (“[Forfeiture] is intended to reduce criminal activity by denying offenders the
profits from their crimes.”).
91 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981(e)(6) (2012) (authorizing forfeiture to be used “as restoration to
any victim of the offense giving rise to the forfeiture, including, in the case of a money laundering
offense, any offense constituting the underlying specified unlawful activity”); Cassella, supra note
88, at 348 (“[R]estoration of property to victims in white-collar cases is the first priority of law
enforcement when it comes to disbursing forfeited property.”); Richard Weber, Introduction, 55
U.S. ATTYS’ BULL. 1, 6 (2007) (identifying one of the guiding principles of civil forfeiture as
“[r]estor[ing] property to crime victims”).
92 See Grant McCool, Ruth Madoff Forfeits Asset Claims, Left with $2.5 million, REUTERS, June
27, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/06/27/us-madoff-ruth-idUSTRE55Q0
BF20090627 (describing the forfeiture of the Madoff ’s assets); Larry Neumeister, Peter Madoff,
Bernie Madoff ’s Brother, to Forfeit $143.1 Billion on Fraud Charges, HUFFINGTON POST ( June 27,
2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/27/peter-madoff-bernie-madoff_n_1632124.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/Y4AG-QKG8 (reporting that Peter Madoff “agreed to the criminal
forfeiture of $143 billion, including all of his real estate and personal property”).
93 Stillman, supra note 21 at 53. For current information on the fund, see U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, ASSETS FORFEITURE FUND, FY 2013 PERFORMANCE BUDGET (2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2013justification/pdf/fy13-aff-justification.pdf.
94 See TREASURY EXEC. OFFICE FOR ASSET FORFEITURE, TREASURY FORFEITURE FUND,
FY 2013 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET SUBMISSION 4 (2013), available at http://www.treasury.gov/
about/budget-performance/Documents/17%20-%20FY%202013%20TEOAF%20CJ.pdf (“Deutsche
Bank AG (Deutsche Bank) forfeited $403.8 million in late September 2011.”).
95 Asset Forfeiture Program—Current Auctions/Sales, U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE, http://
www.usmarshals.gov/assets/sales.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/GG7EDGWH.
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III. REFINING THE ISSUE
As stated in the thesis, the challenge of civil forfeiture is determining
how to finely tune the incentives underlying the program. Police should be
encouraged to go after big-ticket items while maintaining the personal
property of innocent individuals safe from government seizure.
After the more general discussion above, I refine the focus here. Since
forfeiture allows for seizure of both real property and chattel, the distinction
between the two is a natural and important one to make.96 In addition to
separating chattel from real property, chattel itself ought to be divided into
three categories: high-value chattel (HVC) (value higher than $10,000),
mid-value chattel (MVC) (value between $2000 and $10,000); and low-value
chattel (LVC) (value less than $2000).
Of these, I will focus on MVC and LVC for several reasons. First,
CAFRA imposes additional protections for real property. For instance, real
property can never be the subject of administrative forfeiture; notice is
required.97 Second, there is also a more resilient innocent owner defense for
real property.98 Finally, there is an additional statute linked to CAFRA,
section 985, which provides further safeguards for real property.99
I also exclude HVC for two reasons. First, police should be encouraged to
pursue HVC, as it most strongly meets the justifications for civil forfeiture:
stripping away the instrumentalities of crime or removing the fruits of
criminal success.100 More importantly, the intrinsic value of HVC forfeiture
means that a legal defense is economically rational.
The economic rationality of defense is central to this Comment. Defense
in forfeiture actions is expensive, and counsel is often not provided for
indigent defendants.101 Lawyers’ fees only add to this cost, meaning that
96 I lump movable currency in with chattel, although there are clearly distinctions between
the two. The general focus, however, is less on the difference between property conceptions of
chattel and monetary instruments, and more on the inherent value of the property at question.
Thus, for ease of reference, chattel and currency will be considered together.
97 See 18 U.S.C. § 985(c)(1) (2012) (providing for notice in civil forfeiture proceedings against
property). Even before the passage of CAFRA, the Court recognized that forfeitures of real
property required notice. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 52-60
(1993) (reciting the reasons for requiring notice before forfeiture of real property).
98 See 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(3)(B)(i) (refusing to apply exceptions to the innocent owner
defense if the property in question is the claimant’s primary residence); Holcomb et al., supra note
70, at 277 tbl.2 (pointing to several states, including Alabama, Kentucky, and Maine, in which the
government has the burden in the innocent owner defense only for real property).
99 For instance, 18 U.S.C. § 985(b)(1)(B) provides that real property owners who are subject
to forfeiture may not be evicted during the pendency of that action.
100 See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
101 CAFRA only provides for counsel for indigent defendants in narrowly defined circumstances. 18 U.S.C. § 983(b)(1)(A) (“If a person with standing to contest the forfeiture of property
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HVC is oftentimes the only chattel worth defending; for instance, the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) estimates that the average cost of
forfeiture defense in Georgia exceeds $5000.102
Circumstantial evidence indicates that it is often only real property or
HVC that merits a defense. Indeed, all of the seminal forfeiture cases
involve the defense of real property or HVC. In Calero-Toledo, for instance,
the property at issue was a yacht;103 in Bajakajian the government sought the
forfeiture of over $300,000;104 and in United States v. James Daniel Good Real
Property, the property at issue was Mr. Good’s home.105 Since MVC and
LVC often do not economically merit a defense, very few forfeiture cases
are contested at all; the rate of contested cases pre- and post-CAFRA has
only been about twenty percent.106
Thus, I seek to construct a system that allows for the maximum protection
for mid- and low-value chattel. The focus on MVC and LVC is important,
as these items represent the lion’s share of forfeitures. For instance, in
Georgia, the police seized $2.76 million in forfeitures in 2011; items worth
$650 or less comprised more than half of this amount.107
in a judicial civil forfeiture proceeding . . . is financially unable to obtain representation by
counsel, and the person is represented by counsel . . . in connection with a related criminal case,
the court may authorize counsel to represent that person with respect to the claim.”). Even vis-àvis counsel, CAFRA extends additional protections to real property. See id. § 983(b)(2)(A)
(ensuring legal defense when a claimant is defending his or her residence).
102 Chloe Cockburn, Easy Money: Civil Asset Forfeiture Abuse by Police, ACLU (Feb. 3, 2010,
1:16 PM), https://www.aclu.org/print/blog/criminal-law-reform/easy-money-civil-asset-forfeitureabuse-police, archived at http://perma.cc/N35A-MWEA.
103 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 664 (1974).
104 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 324 (1998).
105 United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 46 (1993).
106 See Oversight of Federal Asset Forfeiture: Its Role in Fighting Crime: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Oversight of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 90 (1999)
(statement of Roger Pilon, Dir., Cato Ctr. for Constitutional Studies) (“The Justice Department’s
principal spokesman for forfeiture has claimed that 80 percent of forfeitures are uncontested.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Cassella, supra note 88, at 354 n.20 (“Prior to the enactment
of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) estimated that 85 percent of forfeitures in drug cases were uncontested. Since CAFRA,
which made it easier to contest a forfeiture action, the number of uncontested DEA cases has
dropped to 80 percent.”); Mike Fishburn, Gored by the Ox: A Discussion of the Federal and Texas
Laws that Empower Civil-Asset Forfeiture, 26 RUTGERS L. REC. 4, 19 (2002) (“About eighty
percent of all civil-forfeiture cases are uncontested.”).
107 See Stillman, supra note 21, at 57 (“In 2011 . . . fifty-eight local, county, and statewide
police forces in Georgia brought in $2.76 million in forfeitures; more than half the items taken
were worth less than six hundred and fifty dollars.”); see also Nick Sibilla, DA’s Office in Georgia
Used Asset Forfeiture Funds on Booze, Steak, Galas, and to See Ceelo Green, INST. FOR JUST. (Oct. 11,
2013) [hereinafter Sibilla, DA’s Office in Georgia], http://ij.org/da-s-office-in-georgia-used-asset-forfeiturefunds-on-booze-steak-galas-and-to-see-ceelo-green, archived at http://perma.cc/3Z78-A7KW (“As for
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The dispersion of the practice is hard to estimate, as many states simply
do not report forfeiture data.108 However, a survey on Westlaw is revealing.
Perusing the first fifty results for a search for “Civil Forfeiture” within a
three-month time frame returned forty-eight results that constitute HVC.109
Representative cases like United States v. 2,000,000 in U.S. Currency110 or
United States v. 2005 Porsche Cayenne111 dominate the landscape. Only two
results were even in the realm of MVC: United States v. Approximately $3,199
in U.S. Currency112 and United States v. One 2005 Jeep Cherokee Ltd.113
LVC is not represented at all in this search. We can thus infer that it is
simply not worth the time or energy to contest the seizure of LVC. Police,
then, can essentially seize LVC without check. Protecting this type of chattel
is rendered even more important because police are often incentivized to
pursue MVC and LVC forfeiture: “When there’s less than $2,000 at stake,
law enforcement agencies in the state get to keep 70 percent of what they
take. If more than $2,000 is taken, departments can keep half.”114
the property being seized in the Peach State, the median value was worth $647. Evidently,
forfeiture mainly targets working-class Georgians, not drug kingpins.”); Nick Sibilla, Seize First,
Ask Questions Later: Philadelphia Police Take Over $6 Million a Year in Civil Asset Forfeiture, INST.
FOR JUST., http://ij.org/seize-first-ask-questions-later-philadelphia-police-take-over-6-million-ayear-in-civil-asset-forfeiture (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/
T6VU-E4SH (“The average amount of cash taken in a currency forfeiture case was $550, while some
cases involved amounts less than $100, belying the myth that forfeiture mainly takes money from drug
kingpins.”).
108 See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 19, at 27 (explaining that only nineteen states provide
“reliably useful information” about forfeiture).
109 Search Results, WESTLAW NEXT , http://next.westlaw.com (search for “civil forfeiture,”
then select “Cases” in the “View” menu and “Last three months” in the “Date” menu) (last visited
Jan. 16, 2015).
110 No. 12-1279-18, 2013 WL 5462320, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2013) (concerning the forfeiture
of two million dollars in relation to money laundering).
111 No. 12-423, 2013 WL 5755044, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 23, 2013) (concerning the forfeiture of
a Porsche purchased with fraudulent proceeds).
112 No. 07-1587, 2013 WL 486278, *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2013) (concerning the forfeiture of less
than $4,000 in jewelry).
113 No. 12-720, 2013 WL 6440508, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 9, 2013) (concering the forfeiture of
a Jeep Cherokee in relation to a drug transaction).
114 Radley Balko, Under Asset Forfeiture Law, Wisconsin Cops Confiscate Families’ Bail Money,
HUFFINGTON P OST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/20/asset-forfeiture-wisconsin-bailconfiscated_n_1522328.html (last updated May 21, 2012, 2:53 PM), archived at http://perma.cc/FZ
W2-DWLP. Many commentators have sounded the alarm that the current economic incentive
structure essentially renders forfeitures of LVC and MVC immune to accountability. See, e.g.,
Karis Ann-Yu Chi, Comment, Follow the Money: Getting to the Root of the Problem with Civil Asset
Forfeiture in California, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1635, 1642 (2002) (“Some defense attorneys . . . will not
accept a case unless the forfeiture value is large. The expense may discourage contests. For
example, it would not be economical to spend $10,000 in attorney’s fees to contest the forfeiture of
a $5,000 car.”); Randy Balko, Tennessee Asset Forfeiture Bill Seeks to Abolish Abusive Police Practice,
HUFFINGTON POST (last updated Mar. 22, 2013, 3:35 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
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The challenge, then, is to design a system that can adequately protect
against the abuse of forfeiture as directed against MVC and LVC, while
encouraging the lawful pursuit of forfeiture against real property and HVC.
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
Forfeiture—hotly debated in the 1990s—is again assuming a place
among the pressing legal issues of the day. As such, multiple groups have
proposed different solutions for addressing the current national forfeiture
landscape. Unfortunately, none of these solutions adequately addresses the
general problems of civil forfeiture or the more specific problem of MVC
and LVC forfeiture.
A. Inaction
Much of the current law enforcement establishment argues vociferously
against any changes to civil forfeiture, through both public and political
advocacy.115 The arguments in favor of maintaining the existing forfeiture
system can be reduced to two components (1) that forfeiture is an effective
mode of crime control and (2) that forfeiture provides benefits to law
enforcement that makes them more effectively able to police drug crime.
On the first point, law enforcement and prosecutors argue that civil
forfeiture is an essential tool in their arsenal and ought not to be tampered
with. Indeed, during the CAFRA hearings, the Director of the Department
of Justice’s forfeiture program testified that “[a]sset forfeiture can be to
modern law enforcement what air power is to modern warfare.”116
Others have echoed this refrain. The Fourth Circuit, in United States v.
Two Tracts of Real Property with Buildings, called forfeiture “[o]ne of the most
potent weapons in the government’s war on drugs.”117 This is the case
because, although low-level drug dealers are essentially fungible, the
2013/03/22/tennessee-asset-forfeiture_n_2933246.html, archived at http://perma.cc/PK5S-2WWY
(“People are also less likely to go to court to demand the return of smaller amounts of cash or
property of lesser value—even if they’re innocent—because the cost of winning it back often
exceeds its value.”); J. F., Fighting Crime Through Superior Steak, ECONOMIST (Oct. 15, 2013, 2:28
PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2013/10/asset-forfeiture, archived at
http://perma.cc/4ZVY-P6VM (“This sounds as though federal investigators are taking poor
people’s money and stuff so that friends of the Fulton County DA’s office can eat crab cakes in
champagne sauce and enjoy a fancy Christmas party.”).
115 For a discussion of the difficulty of changing civil forfeiture laws via the political process,
see infra notes 255-258 and accompanying text.
116 Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 33, at 55 (citation omitted).
117 998 F.2d 204, 213 (1993).
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property used to make or distribute drugs is often expensive or difficult to
attain; thus, seizing this property can be more effective in stopping drug
distribution than seizing any individual dealer.118 Moreover, forfeiture sends
an important message to criminals that “crime doesn’t pay,” and thus has the
potential to act as a deterrent to individuals contemplating criminal activity.119
Law enforcement advocates also argue that as forfeiture allows for more
effective enforcement against drug criminals, it produces fringe benefits that
further control crime. Scholars note that “[p]olice and prosecutors argue
that 21 U.S.C. § 881 enables them to carry out ordinary law enforcement
business and raise money at the same time—to do well by doing good.”120
Relatedly, law enforcement groups maintain that forfeiture is critical to
maintaining their bottom lines.121 Without such funds, law enforcement
would be bereft of critical equipment and other materials needed to combat
illegal drug distribution effectively.122 Numerous commentators note the
reliance of law enforcement on forfeiture to provide their offices with
equipment. For instance, FBI Special Agent Victor E. Hartman, in a 2001
bulletin, remarked that “[a]sset forfeiture laws . . . allow law enforcement to
use proceeds of certain seizures for equipment and other needs.”123 As
Stillman recounts, not only is the cash from sold property leveraged to
benefit the department, but police often directly repurpose the vehicles of
drug dealers.124
118 See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 33, at 44 (“When criminal prosecution sends a drug
dealer to jail, a subordinate will most likely take his place, but seizing the means of production and
other capital may shut down the trafficking business for good.”).
119 Worrall, supra note 87, at 13 (explaining how forfeiture denies criminals the profits from
their crimes).
120 Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 33, at 55; see also Alison Roberts Solomon, Drugs and Money:
How Successful Is the Seizure and Forfeiture Program at Raising Revenue and Distributing Proceeds?, 42
EMORY L.J. 1149, 1161 (1993) (“[T]he purposes of § 881 civil forfeiture include . . . denying drug
dealers the proceeds of ill gotten gains.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Section
881 was later reformed as CAFRA. See supra notes 35-43 (providing a more detailed discussion of
CAFRA).
121 See Worrall, supra note 87, at 14 (“The obvious advantage of asset forfeiture is its potential
to boost an agency’s bottom line.”).
122 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 629 (1989) (“[T]he Government has a pecuniary interest in forfeiture that goes beyond merely separating a criminal from
his ill-gotten gains; that legitimate interest extends to recovering all forfeitable assets, for such
assets are deposited in a Fund that supports law-enforcement efforts in a variety of important and
useful ways.”).
123 Victor E. Hartman, Implementing an Asset Forfeiture Program, 70 FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL. 1, 2 (2001).
124 Stillman, supra note 21, at 50 (“[Forfeiture] enables authorities to confiscate cash or property obtained through illicit means, and, in many states, funnel the proceeds directly into the fight
against crime.”).
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The arguments are crafted pragmatically. In a U.S. Attorneys’ Bulletin,
Craig Gaumer explained: “Federal civil forfeiture law is a prosecutor’s secret
weapon, a valuable tool used to guarantee that wrongdoers do not reap the
financial benefits of criminal activity or continue to use the tools of their illegal
trade.”125 By contrast, many local officials are even blunter, acknowledging that
forfeiture is simply essential to maintaining their operating budgets.126
Law enforcement is thus intensely critical of restricting forfeiture, which
it sees as both directly and indirectly aiding their ability to combat illegal
drug distribution. Law enforcement agencies would be loath to see their
“most favored weapon” neutered.127 Accordingly, law enforcement groups
such as Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) point out that the
benefits of forfeiture outweigh the negatives and conclude that “it is
difficult to fault financially strapped law enforcement agencies for seeking
resources to continue their crime-fighting efforts.”128
Many of these agencies claim that outrage over forfeiture abuse
misunderstands the practice.129 Therefore, many organizations attempt
to communicate the benefits of civil forfeiture to their communities
through education and outreach programs.130
Despite the vehement opposition of law enforcement agencies and some
federal officials, the current pernicious use of forfeiture is out of control.131
125 Craig Gaumer, A Prosecutor’s Secret Weapon: Federal Civil Forfeiture Law, 55 U.S. A TTYS’
BULL. 59, 59 (2007).
126 See Stillman, supra note 21, at 50 (quoting Steve Westbrook, the Executive Director of the
Sheriff ’s Association of Texas, as saying: “We all know the way things are right now—budgets are
tight . . . . [Forfeiture is] definitely a valuable asset to law enforcement, for purchasing equipment
and getting things you normally wouldn’t be able to get to fight crime.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
127 M. Lynette Eaddy, How Much is Too Much? Civil Forfeitures and the Excessive Fines Clause
After Austin v. United States, 45 FLA. L. REV. 709, 711 (1993) (“In its ongoing war against drugs,
civil forfeiture has perhaps been the federal government’s most favored weapon.”).
128 Worrall, supra note 87, at 29.
129 See id. at 28 (“The ‘Possible Criticisms and Negative Consequences’ section . . . may give
the impression that forfeiture’s negatives outweigh its positives. Nothing could be further from the
truth.”); see also Shaila Dewan, Police Departments Use Wish List When Deciding Which Assets to Seize,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2014, at A12 (“In defense of the practice, Gary Bergman, a prosecutor with
the Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council of Georgia, said civil forfeiture had been distorted in news
reports.”).
130 See Weber, supra note 91, at 1 (defining one of the goals of the “Strategic Plan” as
“[c]ommunicat[ing] the benefits and accomplishments of the [Asset Forfeiture] Program to law
enforcement leadership, government leaders, and the American public”).
131 See supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text (describing the abuse and underreporting of
MVC or LVC forfeiture often due to the financial incentives police have to pursue such forfeiture
and noting that the property is not valuable enough to merit a defense); see also infra notes 149-151
and accompanying text (detailing the use of waivers in forfeiture proceedings to avoid contestation

2015]

Civil Forfeiture Reform

893

As such, simply maintaining the status quo or promoting public education
of the benefits of forfeiture programs is insufficient to solve any of the
problems associated with forfeiture.
B. Expanding Constitutional Defenses
Expanding constitutional defenses is a problematic proposition, as the
property is the defendant in forfeiture actions, with the owner standing as a
third party claimant.132 Hence, the property is relatively unprotected by the
Constitution, as “few of the constitutional safeguards imposed on criminal
prosecutions apply [in civil actions against property].”133 In forfeiture
proceedings, there is no presumption of innocence,134 no right to attorney
representation,135 and no hearsay objection.136
However, the major difficulty with expanding constitutional defenses is—
as noted previously—that most MVC and LVC simply are not economically
valuable enough to merit a defense, absent a blanket right to counsel.137
Although constitutional doctrines may apply, any application will in effect
never be tested because these cases are simply not litigated.

in forfeiture cases); infra notes 181-183 and accompanying text (explaining how the perverse
incentives behind forfeiture result in poor or corrupt policing).
132 Cf. United States v. Certain Real Prop. at 317 Nick Fitchard Rd., 579 F.3d 1315, 1317 (11th
Cir. 2009) (naming the three claimants in the action); Claudio Riedi, Comment, To Shift or to
Shaft: Attorney Fees for Prevailing Claimants in Civil Forfeiture Suits, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 147, 156
(1992) (“[T]he claimant must prove her case by a preponderance of the evidence to be entitled to
the return of her property.”).
133 Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 33, at 47-48.
134 See, e.g., Leyh v. Prop. Clerk of City of N.Y. Police Dep’t, 774 F. Supp. 742, 746 (E.D.N.Y.
1991) (“As noted above, the ‘presumption of innocence’ is inapplicable to a non-criminal proceeding such as the civil forfeiture action.”); Nkechi Taifa, Civil Forfeiture vs. Civil Liberties, 39 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 95, 97 (1994) (“While human defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence . . . inanimate defendants in forfeiture actions are presumed guilty based upon probable
cause that they have been used in the commission of a crime.”).
135 United States v. $292,888.04 in U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1995) (declining to
extend a Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the forfeiture context because the proceeding was
not criminal).
136 United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475, 480-82 (1896) (holding that the right to confront
adverse witnesses does not apply in forfeiture proceedings).
137 See supra note 112 and accompanying text (comparing attorneys’ fees with the average
property seized in civil forfeiture and noting the troubling difference in value).

894

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 867

1. Double Jeopardy
Under the traditional view, espoused in Ursery v. United States, double
jeopardy does not apply to civil forfeiture because it is not punishment in
the traditional sense.138
The Double Jeopardy Clause provides: “[N]or shall any person be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”139 The
clause prohibits subjecting a defendant to successive trials and successive
punishments for the same offense.140 In Ursery, however, the Court overruled both the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, which had held that civil forfeiture
constituted punishment in the context of double jeopardy.141
The distinction between civil and criminal proceedings was central to the
Court’s analysis in Ursery. By holding that forfeiture was not punishment,
the Court signaled that forfeiture lay beyond the purview of the Fifth
Amendment.
This distinction between civil forfeiture and criminal punishment reaches
its ne plus ultra in cases like United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms,
which hold that even acquittal in an underlying criminal case does not
preclude an in rem forfeiture action against associated property.142 The
Court will apply the Double Jeopardy Clause only when the statutory
provision turns the “civil trial into a criminal one.”143
The Court’s analysis is problematic on several levels. As many point out,
this standard will effectively never provide double jeopardy protection in
civil forfeiture.144 Troublingly, the Court’s rationale explicitly depends on

138 518 U.S. 267, 270-71 (1996) (“These civil forfeitures (and civil forfeitures generally), we
hold, do not constitute ‘punishment’ for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.”).
139 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
140 U.S. v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993) (“This protection applies both to successive
punishments and to successive prosecutions for the same criminal offense.”).
141 Ursery, 518 U.S. at 274 (“[T]his Court has considered the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to civil forfeitures, consistently concluding that the Clause does not apply to such
actions because they do not impose punishment.”).
142 465 U.S. 354, 366 (1984) (“We hold that a gun owner’s acquittal on criminal charges
involving firearms does not preclude a subsequent in rem forfeiture proceeding against those
firearms.”).
143 Susan R. Klein, Civil In Rem Forfeiture and Double Jeopardy, 82 IOWA L. REV. 183, 234
(1996); see also 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 362 (“Unless the forfeiture sanction was intended as
punishment, so that the proceeding is essentially criminal in character, the Double Jeopardy
Clause is not applicable.”).
144 Klein, supra note 143, at 229, notes that this bar is so high it can almost never be met.
Indeed, it is often only met in the context of deportation or juvenile proceedings. Id.; see also, e.g.,
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165-66 (1963) (“Congress has plainly employed the
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the historical justification for forfeiture, which is no longer applicable.145 The
Court has also set up different standards of “punishment” in its forfeiture
cases for purposes of comparing Fifth Amendment analysis with Eighth
Amendment analysis.146
The central problem is the Court’s normative focus on the successive
punishment, rather than successive prosecution, rationale for double
jeopardy.147 In practice, prosecutors who fail in criminal trials will often bring
forfeiture proceedings to get a “second bite at the apple” with a lower standard
of proof.148 These actions are just like sequential criminal proceedings, and
commentators urge that they be treated accordingly by extending double
jeopardy protection to forfeiture actions.149
Although double jeopardy analysis could conceivably provide a framework to protect forfeiture claimants, such a result is unlikely for two
reasons. First, the application of double jeopardy to forfeiture proceedings
could undermine the “legal fiction” of forfeiture, which the Court has thus
far been loath to abandon. Second, many civil forfeiture actions are brought
without a parallel criminal action, thus evading any sort of double jeopardy
protection altogether.
On the first ground, it is unlikely that the Court would extend double
jeopardy protection to forfeiture actions because an admission of the
applicability of double jeopardy would directly contravene the central
sanction of deprivation of nationality as a punishment . . . without affording the procedural
safeguards guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.”).
145 Ursery, 518 U.S. at 282 (explaining that the historical rationale behind forfeiture was central to understanding the distinction between civil and criminal penalties). Justice Stevens, in his
dissent in the case, noted that a continued reliance on forfeiture’s historical in rem roots may be
inappropriate. Id. at 301 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (calling the historical fiction of treating forfeiture
as an in rem proceeding only against property “fanciful”).
146 Compare United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 333 (1998) (describing the forfeiture as
punitive because the government proceeded directly against Bajakajian in personam rather than
against his currency in rem), with Ursery, 518 U.S. at 278 (“In rem civil forfeiture is a remedial civil
sanction, distinct from potentially punitive in personam civil penalties such as fines, and does not
constitute a punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause.”). However, language in Bajakajian
indicates that the historical “guilty property” legal fiction continues to undergird the Court’s
analysis: “Acceptance of the Government’s argument would require us to expand the traditional
understanding of instrumentality forfeitures. This we decline to do. Instrumentalities historically
have been treated as a form of ‘guilty property’ that can be forfeited in civil in rem proceedings.”
524 U.S. at 333.
147 Klein, supra note 143, at 265 (“These abusive parallel civil in rem forfeiture and criminal
proceedings should be barred under the successive prosecution prong of the Double Jeopardy
Clause.”).
148 Id. at 259.
149 See id. (suggesting that because prosecutors can punish defendants through civil actions,
forfeiture actions should be considered among those actions that the Double Jeopardy Clause was
designed to prohibit).
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conceit of forfeiture, namely that forfeiture is an action against the res,
rather than against the offender.150 Throughout the twentieth and into the
twenty-first century, the Court has continually clung to this historic
rationale for forfeiture.151 Because the Court has maintained this artificial
distinction as necessary to preserve the edifice of forfeiture in spite of
significant pressure for reform,152 double jeopardy protection is unlikely.
The second ground is more troubling because, in many forfeiture cases,
double jeopardy will simply not apply. Consider two alternative scenarios:
the case of the Adams family153 and the case of the Caswell family.154 The
owners of the property had not been charged with any wrongdoing in either
situation, but authorities seized each family’s belongings simply because it
was connected to illegal behavior on the premises.155 Double jeopardy is
completely inapplicable in both instances because no action against the
property or owners was possible except for the forfeiture action.156 Similarly,
in the case of Willie Jones, double jeopardy would not protect Mr. Jones,
who was not accused of any criminal wrongdoing, but was nonetheless
forced to forfeit his cash.157
150 See, e.g., United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 363 (1984) (noting that the forfeiture is filed against the res); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416
U.S. 663, 684 (1974) (describing the roots of forfeiture as an in rem action).
151 See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 686 (“[W]hether the reason for [the forfeiture] be artificial
or real, it is too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now
displaced.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
152 See, e.g., supra notes 120-128 (detailing various theories recommending the extension of
double jeopardy protections to forfeiture actions).
153 See Stillman, supra note 21, at 51-52 (describing the forfeiture of the Adams’ home based
on a minor drug deal in which the Adams’ son was involved on the porch of the family home).
154 See Press Release, Inst. for Justice, IJ Scores Major Federal Court Victory in Massachussets
Civil Forfeiture Case ( Jan. 24, 2013), available at http://ij.org/massachusetts-civil-forfeiture-release1-24-2013 (relaying the court victory for the Caswell family, which contested the federal seizure of
their hotel for “facilitat[ing]” drug crimes by guests).
155 In the case of the Adams family, Philadelphia officials sought the forfeiture of the family
home because their son sold twenty dollars worth of marijuana to a confidential informant.
Stillman, supra note 21, at 51-52. Similarly, federal officials sought the forfeiture of the Caswell’s
hotel because Mr. Caswell “facilitated” drug crimes by having guests use drugs in his rooms. None
of Mr. Caswell’s measures—installing security cameras and bright lights and allowing police free
rooms for drug busts—stopped the seizure, although he subsequently prevailed in his federal case.
Russ Caswell, Congress Must Protect Americans from ‘Policing for Profit’: Motel Owner Lives Through ‘Civil
Forfeiture’ Horror Story, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/
feb/9/caswell-the-covetous-cops-of-motel-caswell/?, archived at http://perma.cc/W4HD-W36P.
156 See United States v. 434 Main St., 961 F. Supp. 2d. 298, 302-03 (D. Mass. 2013) (“There is
no contention in this case that anyone from the Caswell family has been involved in any criminal
activity either at the Motel or elsewhere. It is undisputed that they are a law-abiding family. Mr.
Caswell testified that he had never been charged with any crime in his life.”).
157 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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Thus, even in the unlikely event that double jeopardy were extended to
the civil forfeiture context, the doctrine would act perversely to protect
those who had been convicted of criminal offenses, rather than innocent
owners who had their property seized because of its probable connection to
illegal activity.
2. The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments
Due process was one of the explicit concerns underlying CAFRA.
Representative Henry Hyde, sponsor of CAFRA, openly recognized that
“[d]ue process is overdue for some protection.”158 Forfeiture implicates
multiple due process issues, three of which are discussed here.
First, forfeiture implicates procedural due process concerns about court
access. The Court and CAFRA have both largely addressed this issue. In
James Daniel Good, the Court held that the Due Process Clause protected
owners from having their real property seized by the government without
being afforded the right to be heard in court.159 This decision brought real
property forfeiture squarely within the ambit of procedural due process
protection.160 The Court has also drawn links between the right to own
property in a community and the right of access to its courts, finding the
two implicitly related: “[t]he right of a citizen to defend his property
against attack in a court is corollary to the plaintiff ’s right to sue there.”161
CAFRA has also picked up the torch, requiring notice for seizures of real
property.162
Unfortunately, although James Daniel Good extended procedural due
process protection to real property forfeiture,163 it is unlikely that such
protection would ever extend to MVC or LVC. Indeed, the Court in James
158 Rep. Henry Hyde, Chairman, House Judiciary Comm., Forfeiture Reform: Now or Never?, Remarks at the Cato Institute (May 3, 1999), available at https://www.aclu.org/technologyand-liberty/statement-rep-henry-hyde-forfeiture-reform-now-or-never.
159 United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 62 (1993) (“[T]he Due Process Clause requires the Government to afford notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard
before seizing real property subject to civil forfeiture.”).
160 See Mary M. Cheh, Can Something This Easy, Quick, and Profitable Also be Fair? Runaway
Civil Forfeiture Stumbles on the Constitution, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1994) (describing the
James Daniel Good ruling as ensuring due process protection in forfeiture cases).
161 Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 828 (1996); see also Fishburn, supra note 106, at 13
(describing the Degen holding as extending some minimal due process protections to civil
forfeiture).
162 See 18 U.S.C. § 985(c)(1) (2012) (describing the required process for forfeiture of real
property).
163 510 U.S. at 62.
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Daniel Good explicitly held that the due process protections afforded to the
defendant in that case would not apply to chattel.164
The Court’s reasoning depended heavily on a test laid out in Mathews v.
Eldridge.165 The Mathews test determines when “extraordinary circumstances”
exist to excuse the requirement of pre-hearing notice.166 The three Mathews
factors—(1) the nature of the private interest at stake, (2) the risk of error
associated with the procedure used, and (3) the government’s interest,
including the administrative burden of a more elaborate procedure167—
weigh heavily against extending procedural due process protection to MVC
and LVC.168
The third factor proves the most directly problematic for chattel. In
James Daniel Good, the Court found critical the fact that the real property
could not be removed from the seizing court’s jurisdiction pending the
hearing.169 The Court contrasted Calero-Toledo,170 and insinuated that preforfeiture notice for chattel is almost never appropriate, recognizing the
importance of immediate seizure to maintaining a court’s jurisdiction over
movable property.171
This statutory framework has been used to provide forfeiture protection
for automobiles. In Krimstock v. Kelly, the Second Circuit applied the
Mathews factors to a New York statute that provided for the forfeiture of
automobiles.172 Then-Judge Sotomayor considered the deprivation of the
claimant’s vehicle, which she noted was significant due to the centrality of a
vehicle to an individual’s ability to earn a living.173 She weighed this against
the State’s interest in keeping potentially forfeitable property safe from

164
165
166

Id. at 57 (explaining the difference between the seizure of real property and chattel).
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
James Daniel Good, 510 U.S. at 53-54; see also Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (noting that due
process is a flexible concept and depends on the context).
167 Mathews, 424 U.S at 335; see also Chi, supra note 114, at 1644 (explaining the Mathews
factors and their application to chattel vis-à-vis real property).
168 See Chi, supra note 114, at 1644 (“[A] mobile object can easily move out of the court’s
jurisdiction and would do so unless seized immediately, without delays that may result from notice
and hearing.”).
169 See 510 U.S. at 57 (“[R]eal property cannot abscond.”).
170 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
171 James Daniel Good, 510 U.S. at 57 (“First, immediate seizure was necessary to establish the
court’s jurisdiction over the property, and second, the yacht might have disappeared had the
Government given advance warning of the forfeiture action.” (citation omitted)).
172 306 F.3d 40, 60-68 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that the district court applied the Mathews
balancing test to determine what procedural safeguards would be appropriate in this case).
173 Id. at 61 (“The particular importance of motor vehicles derives from their use as a mode
of transportation and, for some, the means to earn a livelihood.”).
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destruction or sale.174 Finally, Judge Sotomayor noted that the city’s preseizure procedures did not adequately protect against the erroneous deprivation of an interest.175 As such, Judge Sotomayor found that the Mathews
test required due process protections for automobiles, including swift
hearings after their seizure.176
Although Judge Sotomayor’s opinion provides some hope for expanding
procedural due process protection to chattel, it is unlikely this would help
protect MVC or LVC for two reasons. First, key to the first component of
the Mathews test was the fact that vehicles are so central to their owners and
are often the lynchpin of their livelihoods.177 The same cannot be said of
MVC or LVC, which often consist of personal property, jewelry, or petty
cash, which do not bear as directly on an individual’s ability to earn a living.
Second, in Krimstock, Judge Sotomayor continued to rely on the fact that the
vehicles at issue—cars seized pursuant to a DUI arrest—were already in the
State’s possession and thus immovable, unlike the yacht in Calero-Toledo.178
Again, this offers little help for protecting MVC or LVC, which are usually
eminently transportable.
Mobility is a concern because the central notion of forfeiture depends on
the res actually being before the court.179 Thus, since any form of chattel—no
matter how valuable—can be removed from the seizing court’s jurisdiction
pending a hearing, courts are unlikely to extend procedural due process
protection to MVC or LVC.180
Civil forfeiture also invokes a substantive due process issue: impartiality.
Indeed, impartiality is essential to justice, and the principle is embedded in
the due process guarantee. The Court has found the right abridged whenever
a conflict exists that could “offer a possible temptation to the average man as
a judge . . . not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.”181

174
175
176
177

Id. at 64.
Id. at 62-63.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 61 (“A car or truck is often central to a person’s livelihood or daily activities. An
individual must be permitted to challenge the City’s continued possession of his or her vehicle.”).
178 Id. at 65 (“The critical difference between Calero-Toledo and the present case is that plaintiffs’ vehicles have already been seized and are in the hands of the police. Just as with real property
seized by the government in forfeiture proceedings, there is no danger that these vehicles will
abscond.”).
179 See United States v. James Daniel Good, 510 U.S. 43, 57 (1993) (“It is true that seizure of
the res has long been considered a prerequisite to the initiation of in rem forfeiture proceedings.”).
180 See Chi, supra note 114, at 1644 (“Application of [the Mathews] factors has resulted in
exceptions in almost all cases involving personal property.”).
181 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927); see also Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 33, at 57
(“Impartiality is inseparable from justice.”).
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The Court, in Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., created a problematic precedent for
those seeking to extend the conflict of interest doctrine into the forfeiture
context.182 In Jerrico, the defendant, a restaurant management company,
challenged a provision in the Fair Labor Standards Act requiring the return of
fines to the enforcing agency to defray the costs of enforcement.183 The
defendant argued that “this provision created an impermissible risk and
appearance of bias by encouraging the assistant regional administrator to make
unduly numerous and large assessments of civil penalties.”184
The Court, however, after restating the principle that “[t]he Due Process
Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in
both civil and criminal cases,” found for the government.185 The Court
distinguished previous impartiality cases—including, most centrally, Tumey
v. Ohio186—and held that the remuneration provision did not create impermissible bias. The Court distinguished Tumey on the basis that, in Jerrico, no
official’s salary depended directly on the level of fines and the fines amounted
to less than one percent of the Employment Standards Administration’s
annual budget.187
From Jerrico, we can coalesce three concerns that determine impartiality:
financial dependence, personal interest, and funding formulas.188 Importantly,
the Court has drawn a sharp distinction between prosecutorial and judicial
impartiality.189
Despite this distinction, it seems clear that an application of the three
Jerrico factors to forfeiture could find that forfeiture impinges on impartiality.
Although personal interest on the prosecutors’ part may be lacking, as
discussed infra, prosecutors and police have a marked pecuniary interest in

182
183
184
185
186
187

446 U.S. 238 (1980).
Id. at 240-41.
Id. at 241.
Id. at 242.
273 U.S. 510 (1927).
Jerrico, 446 U.S. at 247 (relying on the fact that the administrator at issue in Jerrico did not
exercise anything like the judicial discretion seen in Tumey). The one percent of funding distinction was also important to the Court’s decision: “Nor is there a realistic possibility that the
assistant regional administrator’s judgment will be distorted by the prospect of institutional
gain. . . . [T]he civil penalties collected . . . represent substantially less that 1% of the budget of the
ESA.” Id. at 250.
188 Id. at 247-51; see also Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 33, at 61-62 (listing succinctly the
three Jerrico factors).
189 Jerrico, 466 U.S. at 248 (“The rigid requirements of Tumey and Ward, designed for officials performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions, are not applicable to those acting in a
prosecutorial or plaintiff-like capacity.”).

2015]

Civil Forfeiture Reform

901

high levels of forfeiture.190 Moreover, the distinction may be artificial: “the
Court’s sharp distinction between judicial and prosecutorial standards is
controversial and belies the overwhelmingly dispositive role of discretionary
prosecutorial decisions in a system where few cases ever go to trial.”191
But even accepting arguendo the Jerrico distinction, its application to civil
forfeiture is tenuous. The actions of police and prosecutors seeking forfeiture are substantively different than that of the ESA in Jerrico. Indeed,
unlike the ESA, police agencies use violent and dangerous tactics, which
threaten liberty and life in ways not contemplated in Jerrico.192
Substantive due process protection in the form of impartiality requirements unfortunately does not also hold out much hope for protecting MVC
and LVC. As noted, the Court in Jerrico repeatedly distinguished between
adjudicative officials and prosecutors, noting that prosecutors need not
remain “neutral and detached.”193 In an adversarial system, the courts
strive to maintain incentives for prosecutors to zealously pursue justice.194
Although the distorted profit mechanisms of civil forfeiture have led many
to be disturbed by conflicts of interest, the Court has yet to step over the
formalistic prosecutor–adjudicator divide to examine the real and looming
conflict of interest.
Finally, due process is implicated in the disturbing use of waivers in
forfeiture. Although this issue is difficult to quantify as substantive or
procedural, elements of both underpin this concern.
Essentially, using waivers in forfeiture allows police departments to
completely bypass the judicial system. Police departments entice individuals
to sign away their rights to property via waiver in exchange for nonprosecution for some related offense. In Florida, Delane Johnson was
190 See supra notes 81, 221-224 and accompanying text (describing the perverse incentives set
up under the forfeiture system, which allows police and prosecutors to retain seized funds and
property); see also Blumenson & /Nilsen, supra note 33, at 69 (“One Department of Justice manual
governing racketeering prosecutions, for example, suggests that prosecution may be contingent on
the presence of forfeitable assets, rather than forfeiture being an incident of prosecution.”);
Stillman, supra note 21, at 61 (detailing how the District Attorney of Tenaha, Texas, named in a
class action suit filed by forfeiture targets, attempted to use forfeiture funds for her own defense).
191 Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 33, at 69.
192 It is important to compare the peaceful enforcement of the ESA in Jerrico with the sometimes-violent actions carried out to enforce forfeiture. In Jerrico, the ESA and defendant Jerrico
contested the matter peaceably, resorting to the Court. By contrast, law enforcement officers often
carry out forfeiture with great violence. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (describing the
violent death of Donald Scott at the hands of officials seeking the forfeiture of his ranch).
193 466 U.S. at 248 (citation omitted).
194 See id. at 248-49 (“The constitutional interests in accurate finding of facts and application
at law, and in preserving a fair and open process for decision are not to the same degree implicated
if it is the prosecutor, and not the judge, who is offered an incentive for securing civil penalties.”).
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required to sign away his property to avoid trial for another criminal
charge.195 Similarly, in Tenaha, Texas, prosecutors and police frequently
threatened motorists with aggressive, felony drug charges if motorists would
not agree to forfeit their property.196 The use of these waivers should be
invalidated under any theory of due process, since “[t]he use of assetforfeiture waivers deprives property owners of due process because there are
no forfeiture proceedings.”197
Thus, although due process should unequivocally eliminate some forfeiture programs—like the use of waivers in chattel seizure—it is unlikely to
extend much real protection to MVC or LVC.
3. Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment
When asset forfeiture is partly punitive, it is subject to an excessive fines
analysis.198 The appropriate inquiry under this Eighth Amendment analysis
is whether the forfeiture is “grossly disproportional to the offense.”199 Congress explicitly approved this standard in CAFRA by requiring the claimant
to prove that the forfeiture was “grossly disproportional.”200
Unfortunately, there are two problems with this approach. The first is
that lower courts selectively apply it, often distinguishing “proceeds”
forfeiture from other types of forfeiture and refusing to undertake an
Eighth Amendment analysis.201 For instance, the Fifth Circuit, in United
195 See Eric Moores, Comment, Reforming the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 51 ARIZ. L.
REV. 777, 795-97 (2009) (describing how Florida police used a “Contraband Forfeiture Agreement” to induce Mr. Johnson to forfeit his property in exchange for not pursuing potential charges
against him). The practice was later found unconscionable and public pressure halted the program.
Id. at 796.
196 See Stillman, supra note 21, at 54 (recounting the story of Jennifer Boatright, who was
threatened with criminal prosecution and the removal of her children to foster care if she did not
sign a waiver forfeiting her property to Tenaha).
197 Moores, supra note 195, at 797. Moores is appropriately alarmed that the practice “invites
deceit” since fearful property owners simply sign away their rights rather than contest the
forfeiture. Id.
198 Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609-10 (1993); see also Alexander v. United States,
509 U.S. 544, 558-59 (1993) (finding that forfeiture is no different from a monetary fine and thus
subject to Eighth Amendment analysis).
199 18 U.S.C. § 983(g)(4) (2012); see also United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998)
(holding that the appropriate inquiry is whether the forfeiture is “grossly disproportional to the
gravity of a defendant’s offense”).
200 18 U.S.C. § 983(g)(3)-(4) (2012).
201 See Amanda Seals Bersinger, Note, Grossly Disproportional to Whose Offense? Why the
(Mis)application of Constitutional Jurisprudence on Proceeds Forfeiture Matters, 45 GA. L. REV. 841, 861
(2011) (“Circuit courts disagree as to whether the forfeiture of proceeds gained from a criminal
enterprise is necessarily punitive.”).
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States v. Betancourt, held that criminal proceeds forfeiture can never be
considered punitive.202 Courts consequently bifurcate the inquiry, asking
both whether the forfeiture is punitive and whether it is disproportionate.203
Problematically, many lower courts often “answer the first question with the
second,” confusing the question altogether.204
Establishing how “disproportionate” the forfeiture must be empirically
increases the difficulty of the determination. Some courts have held that
proportionality should be judged according to the gravity of the individual’s
offense. For instance, in United States v. Van Brocklin, the Eighth Circuit
found that holding one codefendant liable for a $1.3 million forfeiture
violated the Excessive Fines Clause because the codefendant’s role was
“secondary” to that of her co-conspirators, and she received little personal
benefit from the criminal activity.205 The Fourth Circuit, by contrast, has
held that proportionality should be measured against the per se gravity of
the criminal enterprise as a whole.206
More difficult is determining exactly how “disproportional” the forfeiture must be empirically. One common technique is to refer to the statutory
fines for a criminal offense and compare them to the value of forfeited
property. In United States v. 817 N.E. 29th Drive, the Eleventh Circuit
upheld the forfeiture of a $70,000 piece of property because the statutory
fine for the defendant’s four cocaine sales was over $1 million.207 If Congress has
endorsed such a fine, the court reasoned, how could it be disproportionate?208
However, this technique obscures the element of “disproportionality”
that offends many. The issue is not the sheer value of the property, but the
connectedness of the property to the crime. Indeed, this concern is rooted in
the fiction of civil forfeiture itself, which depends on the idea of the guilty
202
203

test).

422 F.3d 240, 250 (5th Cir. 2005).
See Bersinger, supra note 201, at 865-66 & n.171 (describing the two-prong Bajakajian

204 Id. (“By finding that proceeds forfeiture is, as a matter of law . . . proportional, courts
ignore the first prong of the Bajakajian analysis. Instead of determining whether a forfeiture is
punitive and then whether it is excessive, courts answer the first question with the second.”); see
also United States v. Black, 526 F. Supp. 2d 870, 885 n.10 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (finding that proceeds
forfeiture is not disproportionate, and therefore not punitive, and noting that “[i]t is not that
proceeds forfeitures are not subject to the Eighth Amendment, but rather that, as direct proceeds of
a crime, they are not disproportionate to the offense”).
205 115 F.3d. 587, 601-02 (8th Cir. 1997).
206 See United States v. Bollin, 264 F.3d 391, 418-19 (4th Cir. 2001) (upholding the forfeiture
despite the defendant’s relatively minor role in the conspiracy).
207 175 F.3d 1304, 1310 (11th Cir. 1999).
208 Id. at 1310-11 (“[T]he sentencing guidelines and the statute agree that a fine of up to
$1,000,000 would be proportional to [defendant’s] crimes; consequently, the forfeiture of a $70,000
property based on those crimes does not violate the Eighth Amendment.”).
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res. Cases like that of Sarah Leino—who lost her home because her husband
was charged with one count of possessing prescription drugs with intent to
distribute—offend these common notions of proportionality.209
Thus, one proposed solution for proportionality is that contemplated in
United States v. Real Property Located at 6625 Zumirez Drive: an instrumentality–
proportionality test.210 Under this test, the court considers not just the value
of the property against the fine, but also attempts to judge the instrumentality of the property to the crime. Specifically, the test considers: “(1) the
gravity of the offense compared with the harshness of the forfeiture; (2)
whether the property was an integral part of the commission of the crime;
and (3) whether the criminal activity involving the defendant property was
extensive in terms of time and spatial use.”211
Such a test better captures standard notions of justice, and looks to see
just how closely the property was involved with the illicit conduct. Moreover,
applying this test in the case of the Leino family would have yielded the
right result—that of allowing Mrs. Leino and her children to remain in
their home.
The instrumentality–proportionality test of Zumirez does offer some
potential relief for MVC and LVC. Most MVC and LVC would probably
not be seen as sufficiently instrumental to drug crimes to pass the Zumirez
test and would therefore qualify for forfeiture. Indeed, most of these items
forfeited are personal items: jewelry, sneakers, or petty cash, and thus not
“instrumental” to any drug offense.212
Unfortunately, the Zumirez standard was generated by a district court
and has not garnered widespread national favor because of its inherent

209 See Isaiah Thompson, House Hunting, PHILA. CITY PAPER, Aug. 15, 2013, at 6, available at
http://issuu.com/phillycp/docs/issuu_8_15_2013 (“Long before the forfeiture action against her house
would be completed . . . Leino would be forced from her house and made homeless along with her three
children.”); Radley Balko, Philadelphia Family Loses Home over a Single Drug Charge, HUFFINGTON POST,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/10/philadelphia-family-loses_n_3899905.html (last updated
Sept. 10, 2013, 12:13 PM), archived at http://perma.cc/734T-BUQF (relaying the story of the Leino
family, who lost its home after Sam Leino was witnessed handing small amounts of prescription
pills in exchange for money “outside the house”).
210 845 F. Supp. 725, 732 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
211 Skorup, supra note 24, at 441; see also Zumirez, 845 F. Supp. at 732-34 (laying out the three
factors Skorup cites).
212 See, e.g., Shakedown in Tenaha, Texas, INST. FOR JUST., http://www.ij.org/about/
3nexium%20order/3192, archived at http://perma.cc/GC3U-WYZU (“Officers seized cash, cars, cell
phones, jewelry and even sneakers.”); Stillman, supra note 21, at 49 (describing the Tenaha police
station, in which two tables “were heaped with jewelry, DVD players, cell phones, and the like”).
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subjectivity.213 Even worse, it appears that most MVC and LVC are forfeited under a “proceeds” theory, which knows no proportionality analysis.214
Without this “instrumentality” analysis, the Excessive Fines Clause of
the Eighth Amendment offers little hope for MVC and LVC. Indeed, the
excessive fines clause and proportionality often cut the other way: expensive
property is protected, while less valuable property is not.
Under the current test espoused by both Bajakajian and CAFRA, MVC
and LVC will remain unprotected. As Bajakajian reminds us, the appropriate
inquiry is whether the forfeiture is “grossly disproportional to the gravity of
[the] offense.”215 As such, it is highly unlikely that MVC and LVC—with a
maximum value of $10,000—will receive any protection.
Indeed, should the current disproportionality practice of comparing
forfeiture values to fine amounts continue, there is no hope for protecting
these types of property, as drug fines frequently run into the millions of dollars.
For instance, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) provides for a maximum fine of $1 million for
trafficking less than 500 grams of cocaine.216 This is a comparatively low fine;
the same section provides for a fine of $10 million for an individual trafficking
in PCP or crack, with fines of $50 million for syndicates.217 By comparison,
most forfeited items—the average value of which is $650218—stand no chance of
insulation under a purely monetary disproportionality standard.
The resulting system is surely a perverse one, because “the small time
dealer risks losing the same amount of property as the drug baron.”219
Unfortunately, with the current state of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence,
the Excessive Fines Clause offers more protection to drug lords holding

213 See, e.g., Kristen Michelle Caione, Note, When Does In Rem Civil Forfeiture Under 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) Constitute An Excessive Fine? An Overview and an Attempt to Set Forth a Uniform
Standard, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1093, 1116-17 (1997) (noting that the Zumirez test—although
admirable—is problematic because of its inherent subjectivity and the tendency of its prongs to
yield conflicting results); Charmin Bortz Shiely, Note, United States v. Bajakajian: Will a New
Standard for Applying the Excessive Fines Clause to Criminal Forfeitures Affect Civil Forfeiture Analysis?,
77 N.C. L. REV. 1595, 1618 (1999) (noting that the Zumirez test has been superseded in the Ninth
Circuit).
214 See supra notes 154-156 (discussing the problematic doctrine of “proceeds forfeiture” and
how it insulates forfeiture from any Eighth Amendment review).
215 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998).
216 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2012).
217 Id. For a more straightforward view of the federal drug penalties, see BRIAN T. YEH ,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30722, DRUG OFFENSES: MAXIMUM FINES AND TERMS OF
IMPRISONMENT FOR VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT AND
RELATED LAWS 1-3 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30722.pdf.
218 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
219 Chet Little, Note, Civil Forfeiture and the Excessive Fines Clause: Does Bajakajian Provide
False Hope for Drug-Related Offenders?, 11 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 203, 219 (2000).
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valuable real estate than to common individuals facing the seizure of their
personal chattel.
C. Removing the Profit Motive from Civil Forfeiture
Excising the profit motive from civil forfeiture is perhaps the most
widely suggested reform. Although governments originally relied upon the
profit motive to induce police departments to pursue forfeitures, allowing
police to profit from forfeiture has led to widespread abuse.
The IJ proposes that the government “[e]nd the direct profit incentive
under civil forfeiture laws. Civil forfeiture revenue should be placed into a
neutral fund, such as one for education or drug treatment, or, most desirably,
in the general revenue fund of the county or state government.”220
Giving individuals the opportunity for pecuniary gains in law enforcement practice creates perverse incentives and potential for abuse.221 Indeed,
reporters have uncovered atrocious tales of exploitation, from flashy cars,222
to concert tickets,223 to popcorn machines.224
Generally, allowing police departments to profit from forfeiture leads to
an aggressive hunt for properties that might be subject to forfeiture. Such an
approach led to the botched raid and death of Donald Scott.225 Indeed, it
220 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 19, at 14; cf. Vanita Gupta, End Policing for Profit, ACLU
(Apr. 12, 2010, 5:18 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/end-policing-profit,
archived at http://perma.cc/HT6-XAUQ (“Rather than giving police and prosecutors a direct
financial incentive to increase forfeitures, states and the federal government should put that money
into a general, neutral fund, perhaps for education or drug treatment.”).
221 See, e.g., Andrew Cohen, Is Anyone Not a Cop in Favor of “Civil Forfeiture” Laws?, BRENNAN
CENTER FOR JUSTICE (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/anyone-not-cop-favor%E2%80%9Ccivil-forfeiture%E2%80%9D-laws, archived at http://perma.cc/3AY3-WT9X (deeming
it pure common sense that civil forfeiture laws create “perverse incentives”); Megan McArdle, How
the Lone Star State Legalized Highway Robbery, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2013-08-07/how-the-lone-star-state-legalized-highway-robbery.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
U5XL-WBFE (“If you give people incentives to take things, then they probably will.”); Inst. for
Justice, New Jersey Ex-Sheriff Fights Civil Forfeiture Abuse, PROGRESS REPORT (Dec. 26, 2002),
http://www.progress.org/tpr/new-jersey-ex-sheriff-fights-civil-forfeiture-abuse/, archived at http://
perma.cc/KNP8-WY8D (describing New Jersey’s forfeiture program as “perverse”).
222 Robyn E. Blumner, Police Are Addicted to Lure of Easy Money, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Aug. 17, 2003, at 7D (recounting the use of flashy seized cars by the Tampa Police Department).
223 Sibilla, DA’s Office in Georgia, supra note 107 (detailing the abuses of forfeiture in Georgia,
including the purchase of CeeLo Green concert tickets).
224 Stillman, supra note 21, at 58 (mentioning a nine-page spreadsheet listing items funded by
Tenaha’s roadside seizures, including a popcorn machine).
225 For a discussion of the botched raid on Scott’s ranch, see supra note 33 and accompanying
text. The quest for profit initially drove the fatal raid on Scott’s ranch. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra
note 33, at 73-74. They show that “as the Ventura County District Attorney’s report concluded, a
purpose of this operation was to garner the proceeds from the forfeiture of Scott's $5 million
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seems that the policy of maximizing profits in this way came from the
highest level. A former head of the Justice Department’s Asset Forfeiture
Section claims the department’s “marching orders” were: “Forfeit, forfeit,
forfeit. Get money, get money, get money.”226
Moreover, the profit motive has led to two other disturbing trends in law
enforcement and forfeiture practice. The first is the “privatization” of civil
forfeiture. In Oklahoma, a contracted private party, Desert Snow, conducted
forfeitures along highways in exchange for ten to twenty-five percent of the
proceeds.227 Public outrage eventually brought the program to a halt.228
The profit motive also results in distorted policing practices. For instance,
the “reverse sting” has become popular. In the reverse sting, police target
buyers of drugs, rather than sellers, because buyers carry forfeitable cash,
while sellers carry only drugs that must be destroyed if seized.229 The
practice is extremely widespread. In Tennessee, for example, the highway
patrol concentrated ninety percent of its enforcement efforts on seizing cash
departing Nashville and only ten percent on the drugs entering Nashville.230
Such procedures are clearly problematic, as they work counter to the stated
objective of forfeiture: getting drugs off the streets. Moreover, such procedures often lead to questionable seizures, such as the seizure of an elderly
couple’s home in Philadelphia after their son completed a few minor
marijuana transactions on the porch.231
ranch.” Id. at 74. This concern continues today. See Dewan, supra note 121 (“[P]rofit motives can
outweigh public safety.”).
226 Cheh, supra note 160, at 4 (internal citations omitted).
227 See David Blatt, Policing for Profit in Oklahoma, OKLA. POL’Y INST. (Aug. 26, 2013), http://
okpolicy.org/policing-for-profit-in-oklahoma, archived at http://perma.cc/Y2H-E3XU (describing
the controversial program); Nolan Clay, Oklahoma DA Halts I-40 Drug Stops After Criticism,
NEWSOK ( J uly 21, 2013), http://newsok.com/oklahoma-da-halts-i-40-drug-stops-after-criticism/
article/3864488, archived at http://perma.cc/CZ38-VVS3 (“After seizing more than $1 million in
cash in drug stops this year, a district attorney has suspended further roadside busts by his task
force because of growing criticism over a private company’s participation.”).
228 Id.
229 See, e.g., Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 33, at 67 (“The chief attraction of the reverse
sting is that it allows police to seize a buyer’s cash rather than a seller’s drugs (which have no legal
value to the seizing agency).”); Chi, supra note 114, at 1645-46 (detailing how the perverse
incentive of profit in forfeiture is reflected in the “reverse sting”).
230 NC5PhilWilliams, NewsChannel 5 Investigates: Policing for Profit, YOUTUBE ( J an. 15,
2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TU_nh51FU14, archived at http://perma.cc/7EHL-EFPH
(full report available at http://www.jrn.com/newschannel5/news/newschannel-5-investigates/policingfor-profit); cf. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 33, at 68 (noting that police have “a financial
incentive to impose roadblocks on the southbound lanes of I-95, which carry the cash to make drug
buys, rather than the northbound lanes, which carry the drugs. After all, seized cash will end up
forfeited to the police department, while seized drugs can only be destroyed” (internal citation
omitted)).
231 See Stillman, supra note 21 (recounting the case of Mary and Leon Adams).
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Proponents of abolishing the profit motive from civil forfeiture claim a
plethora of benefits: not only will it clean up the distorted and damaging police
practices resulting from pecuniary motivation, but departments will also
consider more carefully whether to pursue certain forfeitures if they do not
stand to gain.
Unfortunately, removing the profit motive is far from a magic bullet
where MVC and LVC are concerned. This Comment is not meant to
disparage ending the profit motive as part of comprehensive forfeiture
reform generally. I question instead how effective such a reform would be in
reducing MVC and LVC forfeiture. Relatedly, removing the profit motive
might severely decrease police budgets, hamstringing departments, or
disincentivize the pursuit of the property of large-scale drug dealers.
The first concern, specific to MVC and LVC, is that evidence shows that
police disproportionately target minorities in forfeiture actions.232 Simply
ending profit incentives might not therefore prevent seizures of the property
of minorities, carried out simply to harass them.
The ACLU described Texas forfeiture programs as “a regime of racial
profiling.”233 Another ACLU report describes Texas law enforcement as
specifically targeting minorities: “near the Mexican border, Hispanics allege
that they are being singled out by local law enforcement.”234 Police officers
testifying in a class action suit the ACLU filed in Tenaha, Texas, revealed
that race played an explicit part of their calculus in pursuing forfeiture
actions.235 Benson, Rasmussen, and Sollars reinforce this point, noting that
some law enforcement agencies show a “desire . . . to control racial minorities through the enforcement of such laws.”236 Representative Henry Hyde,
232 Stillman, supra note 21, at 52 (quoting Louis Rulli, a clinical law professor at the University of Pennsylvania, as stating that “[f]or real-estate forfeitures, it’s overwhelmingly AfricanAmericans and Hispanics”); see also Dewan, supra note 121 (“Officials . . . mocked Hispanics whose
cars were seized.”).
233 Chloe Cockburn, Easy Money: Civil Asset Forfeiture Abuse by Police, ACLU (Feb. 3, 2010,
1:16 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/easy-money-civil-asset-forfeiture-abusepolice, archived at http://perma.cc/646K-VPKB.
234 Chloe Cockburn, Texas Statute Paves Way for Highway Robbery, ACLU (Oct. 7, 2009, 4:24 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/texas-statute-paves-way-highway-robbery, archived at
http://perma.cc/JM7H-44R7.
235 Elora Mukherjee, Settlement Means No More Highway Robbery in Tenaha, Texas, ACLU
(Aug. 9, 2012, 11:22 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform-racial-justice/settlementmeans-no-more-highway-robbery-tenaha-texas, archived at http://perma.cc/46XE-DZ33 (recording
police officer testimony stating that “[t]he number one thing is you have two guys stopped, and
these two guys are from New York. They’re two Puerto Ricans”).
236 Bruce L. Benson, David W. Rasmussen & David L. Sollas, Police Bureaucracies, Their
Incentives, and the War on Drugs, 83 PUB. CHOICE 21, 24 (1995).
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in his book, also cites to a study finding that in more than five hundred stops
involving forfeiture actions, over eighty percent had minority drivers.237
It would appear that simply removing the profit motive from forfeiture
might not work to totally remove the tool as one of racial harassment.
Where a police officer maintains negative racial attitudes, he is likely to use
forfeiture to target minority motorists aggressively, regardless of the
eventual monetary outcome. The forfeiture—as a weapon of abuse—
becomes an end in itself.
More generally, there is a concern that if the profit element of forfeiture
were abolished, police departments would be caught in a massive budgetary
crisis and would be unable to maintain other, valuable crime control activities.
As the IJ notes, nearly forty percent of police departments depend on
forfeiture for their budgets.238
Stillman, who heard echoes of similar concerns in interviews, relays that
many officers are concerned their departments “would collapse” if forfeiture
practices become more heavily regulated.239 The COPS bulletin is quite
explicit about the matter: “Though it is an enforcement tool, asset forfeiture
can assist in the budgeting realm by helping to offset the costs associated
with fighting crime.”240 Thus, there is a very real concern that if the profit
motive were eliminated, other valuable law enforcement resources might
likewise suffer, resulting in the scaling back of crime control.
Finally, the profit motive can be influential in prodding police to pursue
HVC or real property forfeiture they might otherwise avoid. It is intuitively
important that, for instance, police seize the major properties of drug
dealers—like the Escobar-owned condos in Miami241—or key instrumentalities
of the drug trade, such as expensive cars or boats, used in transporting
illegal drugs.242 Allowing some profit from forfeiture ensures that the police
will assiduously check on the legal status of wealthy property owners, as
well as impoverished ones. Unfortunately, current forfeiture statutes

237 HENRY HYDE, FORFEITING OUR PROPERTY RIGHTS: IS YOUR
FROM SEIZURE? 38 (1995).
238 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 19, at 12 (reporting that these agencies

PROPERTY SAFE

consider forfeiture
a “necessary budget supplement”).
239 Stillman, supra note 21, at 50.
240 Worrall, supra note 87, at 2.
241 See supra note 32 and accompanying text (describing the seizure of the Escobar properties
and other successes of civil forfeiture).
242 See Stillman, supra note 21, at 59 (describing how police repurpose key instrumentalities
of the drug trade, like cars, in law enforcement activities); see also Blumner, supra note 222, at 7D
(describing the Tampa Police Department’s use of seized cars).

910

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 867

incentivize the pursuit of MVC or LVC by giving police a higher portion of
the profits from less valuable property.243
Thus, although abolishing the profit motive would arguably eliminate
much abuse of civil forfeiture, there are legitimate concerns that such a
measure would wreak havoc on otherwise legitimate law enforcement
measures, disincentivize the pursuit of key drug dealing instrumentalities,
or simply fail to account for the racial bias of the enforcing officers.
D. Abolishing Civil Forfeiture
Abolishing civil forfeiture entirely is the most radical solution, although
it garners support from both ends of the political spectrum. The political
right tends to express concerns about forfeiture violating the sanctity of
property rights.244 The political left, by contrast, considers police overreach,
rights infringement, and racial bias in seizures alarming.245
Many groups, including the IJ, formally advocate for a total ban on all
civil forfeiture, although they often indicate that compromise solutions,
such as those described above, may be required before total abolition.246
Other commentators, however, express concern that further piecemeal
reforms—akin to CAFRA—will only mask the problem, suggesting that “[a]
categorical ban on civil asset forfeiture would be easier to administer than
piecemeal reforms, and therefore more likely to succeed.”247 Most proponents
of an absolute ban on civil forfeiture eschew action at the state level, which

243 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 17.30.112(c) (West 2013) (providing that a court can
award the police the seized property if its value is worth $5,000 or less).
244 See, e.g., Tim Lynch, Policing for Profit: The Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture, CATO INST. at
07:20 (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.cato.org/multimedia/events/policing-profit-abuse-civil-assetforfeiture, archived at http://perma.cc/UDX5-LW6P (“[C]ivil forfeiture laws really create a trifecta
of circumstances that place property rights at risk.”).
245 See, e.g., Civil Asset Forfeiture, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/criminal-law-reform/civilasset-forfeiture, archived at http://perma.cc/9FXS-EEMV (last visited Jan. 16, 2015) (“Asset
forfeiture practices often go hand-in-hand with racial profiling and disproportionately impact lowincome African-American or Hispanic people who the police decide look suspicious.”).
246 See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 19, at 14 (“Ideally, civil forfeiture should be abolished,
at least outside of its narrow historical use in enforcing admiralty and customs laws.”).
247 Ilya Somin, New Yorker Article on Asset Forfeiture Abuse, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 5,
2013, 4:31 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/08/05/new-yorker-article-on-asset-forfeiture-abuse,
archived at http://perma.cc/7BRT-FU9H; see also Steve Clowney, New Yorker Article on Asset
Forfeiture Abuse, PROPERTYPROF BLOG (Aug. 9, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
property/2013/08/new-yorker-article-on-asset-forfeiture-abuse.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
MJ6M-ZSYZ (approving of Somin’s stance on forfeiture).
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equitable sharing easily bypasses, and instead advocate for congressional
action to reform the national forfeiture landscape in one sweeping stroke.248
Although the solution is radical, some states have taken tentative steps
that might eventually result in a total abolition of civil forfeiture. Indeed,
North Carolina already lacks a civil forfeiture statute.249 Meanwhile, Tennessee’s legislature recently introduced a bill that would entirely abolish
forfeiture.250
As attractive as such a solution may be, it is completely unfeasible for
two reasons (1) damage to police budgets and (2) political infeasibility. As
discussed above, forfeiture is critical to police budgeting.251 Thus, any major
drawdown of forfeiture could cripple other important law enforcement
efforts.
Additionally, abolishing civil forfeiture is almost certainly politically
infeasible. In fact, almost every legislative reform of forfeiture at the state
level has been eviscerated. In California, for instance, a bill sponsored by
Assemblyman Chris Norby attempted to close a loophole in equitable
sharing.252 The bill, AB639, would have ended abuses of adoptive sharing by
requiring a court order before an agency could transfer a forfeiture case to
the federal government.253 After extensive lobbying by district attorneys and
law enforcement groups, however, the bill died in the California Senate.254
Similarly, in Tennessee, a bill proposed by Representative Barrett Rich, a
former state trooper, proposed outlawing civil forfeiture entirely.255 However,
the bill was completely rewritten in committee. As one of the sponsors of

248 See, e.g., End Asset Forfeiture, DOWNSIZE DC, https://secure.downsizedc.org/etp/end-assetforfeiture, archived at http://perma.cc/MHA2-4JVK (last visited Jan. 16, 2015) (“Because the courts
will not act to end civil asset forfeitures, Congress must. Another ‘compromise’ asset forfeiture bill
will only lead to more abuses and outrages. Civil asset forfeiture must be abolished.”).
249 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
250 See Nick Sibilla, Tennessee Bill Would Abolish Civil Forfeiture, INST. FOR JUSTICE,
http://www.ij.org/tennessee-bill-would-abolish-civil-forfeiture, archived at http://perma.cc/WA8KBEFV (last visited Jan. 16, 2015) (discussing a Tennessee bill aiming to “eliminate civil forfeiture
in Tennessee”).
251 See, e.g., WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 19, at 12 (reporting that forty percent of police
departments depend on forfeiture to meet budgeting shortfalls).
252 See Steven Greenhut, Why Asset Forfeiture Abuse Is on the Rise, REASON (Aug. 10, 2012),
http://reason.com/archives/2012/08/10/why-asset-forfeiture-abuse-is-on-the-ris, archived at http://
perma.cc/LM32-ZSST (discussing AB639 and its failure to pass the legislature).
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 See Sibilla, supra note 250 (describing the bill in Tennessee that would have dismantled
the state’s forfeiture program).
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the bill complained, “[i]n what is called an amendment, the entire wording
of the bill . . . was literally deleted and new wording replaced it.”256
Finally, in Utah, lawmakers recently passed a forfeiture bill that eviscerated a reform passed in 2000. The law—pitched as a “recodification” of
existing law—contains several troubling features: it gutted awards of
attorneys’ fees to successful claimants, capping them at twenty percent of
the value of the seized property; it reduced the deadline for prosecutors to
file against the property from a sixty-day mandatory deadline to a ninety-day
optional deadline; and it upheld the use of waivers in forfeiture actions.257
Forfeiture reform bills often die because of extensive lobbying of law
enforcement groups or prosecutors. For instance, California Bill AB639
failed because the California District Attorney Association complained
about the burden the bill would place on law enforcement, and the Los
Angeles District Attorney opined that the bill’s only purpose was “to make
it impossible for state/local law enforcement agencies [to] us[e] federal asset
forfeiture procedures.”258 Similar concerns emerged during the debate on
CAFRA, which meant that several proposed reforms were ultimately
excluded from the final version of the bill.259 Finally, pressure from law
enforcement groups, including the International Association of Chiefs of
Police, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, the North Carolina
Department of Crime Control and Public Safety, and the U.S. Attorney
General’s Office, led to the overturning of a 1988 amendment to North
Carolina’s civil forfeiture statute.260

256 See Eapen Thampy, Tennessee Lawmakers Gut Forfeiture Reform Proposal, Push for Ex Parte
Determinations of Probable Cause, AMS. FOR FORFEITURE REFORM (Apr. 8, 2013), http://
www.forfeiturereform.com/2013/04/08/tennessee-lawmakers-gut-forfeiture-reform-proposal-pushfor-ex-parte-determinations-of-probable-cause/, archived at http://perma.cc/B3GS-RUD9 (quoting
Hal Rounds, a co-author of the Tennessee bill frustrated at its evisceration).
257 Jason Snead & Andrew Kloster, Utah’s New Law Helps Law Enforcement Nab Property of
Innocent People, DAILY SIGNAL ( Jan. 21, 2014), http://dailysignal.com/2014/01/21/utah-reversescourt-forfeiture-reforms-hopes-wont-notice/, archived at http://perma.cc/7EB9-WFKK (describing
the provisions of the reforms and likely negative consequences); see also Nick Sibilla, Utah Made It
Easier for Cops to Seize Innocent People’s Property. And Not A Single Lawmaker Voted Against It,
FORBES (Dec. 23, 2013, 9:37 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/instituteforjustice/2013/12/23/
utah-made-it-easier-for-cops-to-seize-innocent-peoples-property-and-not-a-single-lawmakervoted-against-it/, archived at http://perma.cc/YQ3A-V2UU (describing the troubling aspects of the
Utah bill).
258 Greenhut, supra note 252.
259 See, e.g., Holcomb et al., supra note 70, at 275 (describing the power of law enforcement
during the political process, including the fact that several provisions were inserted into CAFRA
that actually “strengthened forfeiture powers in some circumstances”).
260 Benson et al., supra note 236, at 30.
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Thus, although abolishing civil forfeiture entirely would completely
solve the problem, such a move is incredibly unlikely, both because of the
collateral damage to police budgets, and because of the power of law
enforcement in the political process.
V. THE TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH
In this Comment, I propose a transactional paradigm for reforming civil
forfeiture. Although forfeiture actions lack many of the features of a
transaction—most notably a voluntary exchange between parties—the
application of economic insights to forfeiture reveals some new approaches
to dealing with the problem of MVC and LVC forfeiture.261 Specifically, I
construct a theoretical and practical framework that can provide for the ex
ante protection of MVC and LVC by raising the costs of forfeiture actions
to prevent these items from being seized in the first place.
A. Some Insights from Economic Theory
Several economic concepts are applicable to the forfeiture context.
Although forfeiture actions provide a unique “form” of transaction, the
analogy nevertheless applies and can help provide a valuable lens through
which to conceptualize and understand civil forfeiture.
1. Transaction Costs
Before applying the following analyses, we must analytically define
forfeiture as a transaction, despite the fact that it does not fall neatly into the
conventional “transaction” paradigm. Textbook definitions of transactions
tend to focus on the fact that transactions are typically voluntary exchanges
between parties: “An agreement between a buyer and a seller to exchange
goods, services or financial instruments.”262

261 For most of this section, I use “forfeiture” and “seizure” interchangeably. As has been
noted, the actions are legally distinct: police seize the item, followed by the actual forfeiture—a
separate legal action transferring title. However, my concern was with increasing the costs of the
seizure, as the low contest rates in forfeiture actions (eighty percent uncontested, see Oversight
Committee, supra note 106, at 86) mean that the seizure and forfeiture actions often blend together.
There is obviously more empirical work to be done here on top of the more ad hoc analysis I
conducted supra in note 109 to determine the rate at which forfeiture is contested depending on
the value of the chattel. Such work, unfortunately, is outside the scope of this Comment.
262 Transaction Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/transaction.asp
(last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/4YH5-ER3Q.
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Drawing insights from the Calabresi–Melamed and Coasean framework,263 however, legal commentators have expanded their understanding of
transactions. Specifically, the focus is less on the goods per se, and more on
the entitlements underlying those goods.
Calabresi–Melamed’s “property” and “liability” rules essentially relate to
whether or not coercion may be used to obtain an entitlement. Theoretically,
property rule protection prevents the transfer or destruction of entitlements
without the consent of the owner.264 By contrast, liability rules “allow a
would-be buyer to bypass the original entitlement holder’s consent and
instead to take the entitlement through coercion.”265
As such, we may understand civil forfeiture in the context of a “liability
rule” transaction.266 Kontorovich is explicit on the matter: “Constitutional
transactions . . . occur when the government condemns an entitlement
through the judicial process.”267 We therefore must understand forfeiture as
a transaction—one in which an entitlement (i.e., the ownership of MVC or
LVC) is forcibly transferred to the government.
Within this context, we then turn to the concept of “transaction costs.”
For purposes of this Comment, I will define a transaction cost as anything
that renders the transfer of rights more costly. Transaction costs can thus
include tangible costs like search costs, or more intangible costs like
inconvenience. Coase, in his seminal article The Problem of Social Cost,
identified transaction costs as impacting the general level of transactions
in a marketplace: “Once the costs of carrying out market transactions are
taken into account it is clear that such a rearrangement of rights will only be

263 See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (discussing the circumstances in which entitlements are granted); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. &
ECON. 1 (1960) (advocating for economic solutions to social problems that consider the complete
effect of any entitlement granted).
264 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 263, at 1092 (“An entitlement is protected by a property
rule to the extent that someone who wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it
from him in a voluntary transaction.”).
265 Eugene Kontorovich, The Constitution in Two Dimensions: A Transaction Cost Analysis of
Constitutional Remedies, 91 VA. L. REV. 1135, 1143 (2005).
266 A more extensive application of forfeiture within the Calabresi–Melamed framework is
beyond the scope of this Comment, as forfeiture poses complicated questions for that theory. Even
though forfeiture may be understood as a forced transaction, it cannot be truly protected by a
“liability rule” as understood by Calabresi–Melamed. This question will have to be explored more
thoroughly in later scholarship.
267 Kontorovich, supra note 265, at 1144.
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undertaken when the increase in the value of production . . . is greater than
the costs which would be involved in bringing it about.”268
Once forfeiture is placed into this framework, many of the problems
with the practice can be understood as either diminishing or increasing
transaction costs. One critical example is the use of waivers in forfeiture
cases, which drastically reduce transaction costs for police departments.269
The Tenaha police department, for instance, forced motorists to sign prenotarized waivers, ceding their rights to property.270 This approach drastically
decreased transaction costs for Tenaha.
First, the waiver precluded a costly and inconvenient search of property
to assure that it might be subject to forfeiture. The forfeiture was faster and
more convenient, avoiding the mental costs of time or inconvenience and
the empirical cost of paying the searching officer. Second, the waiver was
pre-notarized, decreasing the inefficiency costs of locating a notary public to
notarize the document—something that might not be possible should the
forfeiture occur late at night. Finally, the waiver precluded a later forfeiture
hearing, another costly redirection of resources for the police department.
Similarly, the use of dogs in forfeiture actions also decreases the transaction cost of the forfeiture. First, drug dogs alerting to cars can allow a
search, even without the vehicle owner’s consent, decreasing transaction
costs by avoiding the inefficiency of obtaining a judicial search warrant.271
Second, most U.S. currency contains trace amounts of drug material,
facilitating the seizure of cash with little effort on the part of the officer.272
Drug-sniffing dogs thus facilitate raising revenue, as they alert to almost any
drug-tainted currency, and such an alert is often sufficient to establish
forfeiture. Indeed, cash-strapped police departments are quite explicit about
their use of dogs as a revenue-raising device: “[Police Chief] Andrews told

268
269

Coase, supra note 263, at 15.
Indeed, it appears that police departments themselves intrinsically view forfeiture as a
“profitable” transaction. See, e.g., Dewan supra note 121 (“[O]fficials share tips on maximizing
profits.”).
270 See supra notes 156-158 and accompanying text (discussing the use of waivers in asset
forfeiture cases).
271 For a more thorough discussion of issues regarding drug-sniffing dogs, warrants, and
forfeiture, see infra notes 296-309 (discussing the recent Supreme Court decision in Florida v.
Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1054 (2013), which established a troubling precedent for the use of dogs in
forfeiture.).
272 Willie Jones’s story provides one example of the use of dogs to justify otherwise indefensible forfeiture actions. See Jones v. DEA, 819 F. Supp. 698, 720 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (overturning
the forfeiture of Mr. Jones’s property because it was based on a dog alert; the judge noted the
problems with such alerts, since almost all U.S. currency is drug tainted).
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board members that the city is missing out on possible revenues that a K9
would bring.”273
A final indication that police try to reduce transaction costs in forfeiture
is the practice of directing policing efforts toward roads that contain a flow
of drug buyers, rather than drug sellers.274 This again is an attempt to reduce
the transaction costs of forfeiture actions. Since police have limited
resources, they attempt to divert as many of these resources toward maximizing forfeiture revenues, decreasing inefficiency and enforcement costs for
seizures that will not produce a large return. Other enforcement patterns
reflect a similar attempt to decrease transaction costs, most notably the
reverse-sting operation.275
Recognizing that forfeiture is transactional and that seizing agencies
strive to reduce transaction costs provides insight into potential solutions,
especially those involving MVC and LVC. Because these items represent a
relatively low monetary recovery, any significant increase in transaction
costs would make seizure of such items economically inefficient.
2. Externalities
Applying the transactional paradigm to forfeiture also allows us to
confront the problem of externalities in MVC and LVC forfeiture. Externalities are costs or benefits imposed on parties not directly involved in the
transaction.276 Because externality costs are not factored into the price of
the market transaction, actors engage in socially suboptimal levels of
transactions with externalities.277
Pollution is the classic example: producing many goods imposes significant
costs—negative externalities—on the environment, which are not factored
into the price of the goods themselves. Therefore, because the cost of
pollution is not “priced” into the market, goods are priced too low and thus
overproduced. This results in generally greater environmental costs, such as
273 Orin Kerr, Town Plans to Raise Revenue by Combining Drug-Sniffing Dogs with Asset Forfeiture, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 22, 2012, 11:33 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/08/22/townplans-to-raise-revenue-by-combining-drug-sniffing-dogs-with-asset-forfeiture/,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/R9DK-PHTE (detailing the plans of Henry, Tennessee to “institute a K9 program
for the [local] [p]olice [d]epartment”).
274 See, e.g., supra note 230 and accompanying text.
275 See id. (describing the perverse incentives that lead to reverse-sting operations).
276 Thomas Helbling, Externalities: Prices Do Not Capture All Costs, INT’L MONETARY FUND
(Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/external.htm, archived at
http://perma.cc/RK9L-6PMK (stating that failing to internalizing indirect costs or benefits will
lead to inefficient market outcomes).
277 Id.
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the cost of pollution cleanup.278 Here, neoclassical economics sees government as the solution, as taxes or other incentive programs can force market
actors to price their product for the externality, moving the market toward a
more socially optimal level.279
An externality analysis is also relevant in the forfeiture context. In all
cases, police departments attempt to structure forfeiture “transactions” in a
manner that will increase externalities, pushing costs to other parties so they
may retain the value of forfeiture entirely for themselves.
One clear and concrete example of this is police pushback against the
mandatory grant of attorneys’ fees to victorious claimants in Utah. A prior
version of a Utah fee-shifting statute provided that “the court shall award a
prevailing party reasonable attorneys’ fees and other costs of litigation
reasonably incurred by the owner.”280 By contrast, a newer version of the
statute, HB384, dramatically changed the statute by changing the mandatory
“shall” to the permissive “may,” thus giving courts discretion in whether or
not fees should be awarded.281 HB384 also caps attorneys’ fees at twenty
percent of the property value.282 This change in the statutory language is
an attempt by police departments to impose the costs of forfeiture actions as
“externalities” on non-consenting parties: innocent owners and their
attorneys. Where once the government had to foot the bill for a wrongful
forfeiture—an internalized cost, as it was imposed on the party effectuating
the seizure—the cost is now passed to involuntary parties in the transaction,
namely the claimant and her legal counsel, who must come up with the
extensive fees and time necessary to contest forfeiture actions.
Innocent owner defenses similarly outline the problem of externalities in
forfeiture actions. The case of Bennis—where Mrs. Bennis lost the entire
value of her property even though she was a completely innocent claimant—is
indicative.283 Here, again, the cost of forfeiture was passed on to an

278
279
280

Id.
Id.
UTAH CODE ANN. §24-1-11 (2004) (amended by 2013 Utah Laws 1975, 1986); see also
Radley Balko, Utah Lawmakers Quietly Roll Back Asset Forfeiture Reforms, WASH. POST ( J an. 8,
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2014/01/08/utah-lawmakers-quietly-rollback-asset-forfeiture-reforms/, archived at http://perma.cc/3ZAA-P38F (discussing the discontinuation of asset forfeiture reforms and its effect on Utah residents); Sibilla, supra note 250.
281 See UTAH CODE ANN. §24-1-110(1) (2004) (“In any forfeiture proceeding under this
chapter, the court may award a prevailing party reasonable: (a) legal costs; and (b) attorney fees.”);
Sibilla, supra note 250.
282 UTAH CODE ANN. § 24-1-110(2) (amended by 2013 Utah Laws HB384).
283 Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 453 (1996) (holding that forfeiture was proper considering Michigan’s objective of deterring illegal activities).
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involuntary party—the innocent claimant of the property—constituting a
clear externality.
Any proposed solution to the forfeiture dilemma thus should force the
voluntary party to the transaction (in forfeiture, only the seizing agency) to
internalize its costs so as not to impose burdens on involuntary parties and
to achieve a more socially optimal level of seizure.
3. Nudges
Final insights on this analytical framework emerge from prospect theory
and behavioral economics, specifically the idea proposed by Thaler and
Sunstein in Nudge.284 There, the authors propose that the structure of choices
influences their outcomes.285 As defined by Thaler and Sunstein, a nudge “is
any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a
predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing
their economic incentives.”286 Significantly, in designing choice architecture,
the “default” option often is the most selected; thus, the authors propose that
nudges should be carefully selected to try and maximize social outcomes.287
Similarly, in the context of forfeitures, procedures should be structured
to try to minimize the abuse of the practice. Unfortunately, this is not
currently the case: in many instances, forfeiture procedure is structured to
make forfeiture the “default” option.
Again, the use of waivers in forfeiture is indicative of the practice. The
pre-notarized waivers have removed all procedural barriers to forfeiture; all
property owners must do is sign the form and leave the police station. Thus,
forfeiture has become the “default” option. Switching from the default has a
series of costs for the police department, such as holding the property
without disposing of it and litigating the forfeiture action.
Potential forfeiture solutions, then, should include restructuring forfeiture procedures to erect barriers to viewing forfeiture as the “default”
option. Several levels of decision barriers should be erected, with multiple
decisionmakers, each of whom should agree that the forfeiture is proper.
Forfeiture should never be the “path of least resistance.”
Relatedly, because it is often not economically rational to defend MVC
and LVC against forfeiture,288 this Comment proposes additional procedural
284
285
286
287
288

RICHARD H. T HALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008).
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 6-11.
See supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing the costs of forfeiture defenses).
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burdens that police departments would have to bear before engaging in a
seizure. The goal of increasing the cost of forfeiture actions is to lower
levels of MVC and LVC forfeiture, making it no longer cost-efficient for
officers to seize such low-value property.
B. Proposed Solutions
These economic theory insights provide the civil forfeiture reformer
with several new tools. First, forfeiture procedures should be tailored to
increase transaction costs, specifically so that it is no longer “profitable” for
police to pursue MVC and LVC forfeiture. Second, the burdens imposed by
forfeiture should impact police departments, who should bear the costs
when they engage in a wrongful seizure. Third, forfeiture procedures should
be structured to make forfeiture difficult and inconvenient, requiring police
to actively choose to seize property. Some proposals follow.
1. Require an Immediate in Personam Hearing to Determine
Whether the Seizure is Justified
This solution would function on all of the axes mentioned above. First,
it increases transaction costs, because it would require the seizing police
officer to take the property and its owner to court immediately to justify the
seizure. Such an inconvenience and hassle to the police officer would not
justify the seizure of small personal items, and thus many officers might be
loath to seize a pair of sneakers or petty cash if they know they would have
to engage in a lengthy court hearing.289
Moreover, such a solution also works to correct the externality problem
of forfeiture. The seizing department would be required to bear costs
directly—by spending time and energy in court—rather than passing them
off to innocent litigants seeking to contest the forfeiture down the line.
This solution is also aligned with Thaler and Sunstein’s “nudge” concept.
Officers would not simply be able to follow forfeiture as a “path of least
resistance”; seizure would no longer be the default option. Rather, an officer
would have to justify the seizure in court, which would certainly lead to a
lower incidence of the practice.
Finally, this solution is attractive because it addresses one of the major
problems in forfeiture: that claimants feel entirely disempowered in the
process. For instance, Jennifer Boatright, who had her property seized in
Tenaha, expressed her frustration as follows: “Where are we? . . . Is this
289 As noted in the text accompanying supra note 212, LVC and MVC are often petty personal property like sneakers, cellphones, or jewelry.
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some kind of foreign country, where they’re selling people’s kids off?”290
Adding an immediate review of the action, and allowing claimants to
present their stories to an impartial party, would give individuals a sense
that they, at minimum, were empowered within the process, which is itself a
positive outcome.
2. Require Forfeiture Documentation to be Notarized by
Independent Notaries
This barrier is similar to the first, but procedural rather than substantive
in nature. As noted multiple times, police departments use pre-notarized
forms in forfeiture actions. This practice should not continue. Rather, police
departments processing documents for forfeiture should be required to send
those documents to an external notary. The goal is purely to increase
transaction costs. Sending documents to an external notary is timeconsuming and inefficient. As such, it increases the transaction costs of
forfeiture and would make the forfeiture of MVC or LVC less attractive.
Similarly, the additional step of sending documents to an external notary
works against forfeiture remaining a default option for police departments.
The inconvenience and added effort of sending documents to an external
notary would diminish the attractiveness of forfeiture.
3. Require Extensive Documentation on Any Dogs
Used in Forfeiture Actions
Drug-sniffing dogs are becoming increasingly common in forfeiture
actions, as police departments become ever more aware of their ability to
generate revenue through forfeiture.291 Indeed, dogs are often an excellent
investment, requiring a small, upfront cost that consistently returns revenue
by alerting officers of the presence of drugs on currency.292
Thus, efforts should be made to increase the “expense” of dogs in forfeiture actions. One important factor is maintaining extensive documentation
on the accuracy of dogs in the field. Such data is obviously normatively
relevant to forfeiture actions, and claimants should be able to access this
information in proceedings challenging whether the forfeiture was in fact
justified. Unreliable dogs should create a degree of doubt in the court,
which could potentially reverse the seizure.
290
291
292

Stillman, supra note 21, at 49.
Kerr, supra note 273.
Id.
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Within the suggested framework, the required paperwork on dogs would
greatly increase the transaction costs of forfeiture. An officer’s use of a dog
would require extensive documentation, monitoring, and follow-up, necessitating paperwork and attention to detail. Officers could not use dogs
indiscriminately to seize currency but rather would be expected to maintain
and vouch for the accuracy of their dogs’ alerts.
Moreover, requiring documentation on dog accuracy decreases the “inertia”
of forfeiture. Police would need to assess the accuracy of the dog at every
step, demanding conscious engagement throughout the forfeiture process.
Such an approach is at odds with intellectual inertia and would render
pursuing MVC and LVC forfeiture much less attractive.
4. Disallow the “Alert” of Drugs on Currency to
Justify Forfeiture
Studies report that over ninety percent of currency in the United States
is contaminated with trace amounts of cocaine.293 As such, one easy path to
forfeiture—particularly with petty cash—is to permit a dog to alert on drugtainted cash, justifying the seizure. Indeed, this was the approach followed
in the case of Mr. Willie Jones: after dogs alerted on his cash, authorities
seized almost $9600 from him.294
Scientific studies—such as those previously mentioned—should now
disqualify the drug alert on currency from being considered “probable
cause” for a forfeiture action. Since over ninety percent of U.S. currency is
contaminated, a drug alert on cash is simply not indicative that the money is
in any way related to illegal activity.295
Such an approach would increase the transaction costs of forfeiture by
requiring officers to come up with other, more expensive measures to justify
seizures. Indeed, dog alerts have frequently been cited as a “cost-effective”
way to engage in forfeiture actions for revenue purposes.296 Disallowing the
alert on tainted cash would require police to dig deeper into the nature of
the offense, demanding greater effort on their part. These inconvenience
costs would decrease the rate at which petty cash would be forfeited.

293 See, e.g., Madison Park, 90 Percent of U.S. Bills Carry Traces of Cocaine, CNN (Aug. 17,
2009, 3:01 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/08/14/cocaine.traces.money/, archived at
http://perma.cc/6PNK-VEKR (“Many of th[e] bills, over 90 percent, are contaminated with
cocaine.”).
294 See supra note 34 and accompanying text (recounting the story of Mr. Jones).
295 Park, supra note 293.
296 Kerr, supra note 273.
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5. Require One Hundred Percent of Attorneys’ Fees to
Be Returned to Successful Claimants
The mandated attorneys’ fees grant, an idea which several state legislatures have considered, is an attempt to internalize an externality of forfeiture: the cost of the proceeding. As mentioned, it is often not economically
viable to contest the seizure of MVC or LVC, which is worth less than the
average value of an attorney’s retainer.
The grant of attorneys’ fees, however, confronts the seizing agency with
the real possibility that they would be compelled to pay a victorious claimant’s
fees. As such, agencies would be forced to realize and account for the
increased costs of these awards. In the language of economic analysis, they
would be required to internalize the imposed externality of costly legal
action. This approach would lead to a lower level of forfeiture across the
board, as agencies would be more cautious about seizing property if they
knew of the potential for a monetary award against them.
Moreover, such a change would also decrease the use of forfeiture as a
default option. As discussed above, many forfeiture actions are simply not
contested.297 Thus, forfeiture—for seizing agencies—is relatively easy, as
they can be secure in their belief that the seizure will never be challenged
before a judge. If these agencies, however, were to know of an increased
probability that they would be called to account for their actions, forfeiture
would become much less psychologically attractive.
6. Require Officers Who Would Engage in
Seizure to Obtain Certification
To increase transaction costs of forfeiture for officers, legislatures should
require officers who wish to seize property to become licensed beforehand.
Such a licensing requirement should not be superficial. Rather, officers
should undergo extensive training in forfeiture, studying the justifications
of forfeiture and the potential hardships it can impose on those who lose
their property.298 Such training could also be practical, teaching the proper
bases for forfeiture or different techniques to effect forfeiture. Moreover,
such training should have to be renewed, biannually or at some sufficiently

297
298

See supra note 106 (noting that eighty percent of forfeiture actions are uncontested).
Such training is routine in other contexts. For instance, to use drug dogs, officers in Florida are required to undergo over 280 hours of training. See Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1054
(2013) (describing the training and testing used to establish a drug-sniffing dog’s reliability).
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regular date to both impose a cost on the officer and department and to
keep the real damage of forfeiture prevalent in the officers’ minds.
This proposal would burden forfeiture actions on multiple axes. First, it
would increase transaction costs of civil forfeiture. Departments or officers
would have to pay to certify their officers to engage in forfeitures, a significant monetary investment to maintain the program. Moreover, in individual
forfeiture actions, if an unlicensed officer would wish to seize property, he
would have to radio for backup and get a certified officer present. Such a
time investment would not merit the seizure of MVC or LVC and might
justify leaving such property alone.
Furthermore, training would act as a “nudge” against forfeiture. By
actively educating seizing officers, the training would reduce the subconscious attractiveness of forfeiture actions, particularly if officers were aware
of the havoc forfeiture could wreak on claimants’ lives. Requiring frequent
training is important to keep this knowledge fresh in officers’ minds.
C. Progress?
Unfortunately, progress on these fronts has been muted. Courts and
legislatures have actually gone in the opposite direction, at times reducing
transaction costs, allowing police departments to pursue forfeiture more
easily. Indeed, a recent New York Times article indicates that police
departments across the United States are actually increasing their forfeiture
programs, in spite of public outcry.299
Specifically with regards to drug-sniffing dogs, a recent Supreme Court
decision took the matter in entirely the wrong direction. In Florida v.
Harris, appellant Harris attempted to suppress evidence obtained from a
dog alert on his truck.300 Florida’s Supreme Court allowed the suppression
of evidence, finding a dog’s reliability directly relevant to establishing the
probable cause necessary for a search.301
The Supreme Court, however, overturned the state court’s determination. The Court found field data of dog alerts to be unreliable because it
may potentially fail to capture false negatives or may provide a seemingly
false positive if drugs were too well-concealed to be revealed in a search.302
Much more important to the Court was the dog’s performance in training:
“If a bona fide organization has certified a dog after testing his reliability in
299 Dewan, supra note 121 (“Despite that opposition, many cities and states are moving to
expand civil seizures of cars and other assets.”).
300 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013).
301 Id. at 1055.
302 Id. at 1056-57.
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a controlled setting, a court can presume . . . the dog’s alert provides
probable cause to search.”303
The Court’s reasoning proves problematic in the forfeiture context for
two reasons. First, establishing a presumption in favor of a dog’s accuracy as
a basis for probable cause establishes a dangerous precedent in forfeiture
actions, where probable cause is often the necessary standard for seizure.304
If trained dogs are presumed to be accurate for probable cause purposes,305
then their accuracy would be practically unassailable if a seizure were to
proceed based on a dog’s alert.
More troubling, however, is the Court’s parsing of police motives. The
Court held that the police dogs should generally be trusted because “only
accurate drug-detection dogs enable officers to locate contraband without
incurring unnecessary risks or wasting limited time and resources.”306
However, this is patently not true in the forfeiture context. Instead, it
would advantage police departments to obtain wildly inaccurate dogs that
would constantly alert, thus justifying the seizure of property. Police have
no incentive to ensure the accuracy of their dogs, as they would in a search
context where officers must invest time with an uncertain pay-off.307 This
decision has in fact alarmed forfeiture watchdog groups, like the Americans
for Forfeiture Reform, which, in its commentary on the decision, called the
case “very bad news for anyone concerned with civil asset forfeiture reform
and anyone worried about how these laws corrupt law enforcement and/or
prey on the poor.”308
Progress on other fronts has been similarly troubling. Utah’s legislature
recently eviscerated an effective attorneys’ fee program, which required
one hundred percent of attorneys’ fees to go to successful claimants.309
Additionally, the Tennessee legislature rewrote a bill that would have
required immediate in personam forfeiture hearings.310
303
304

Id. at 1057.
See, e.g., Asset Forfeiture, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/white_collar/assetforfeiture, archived at http://perma.cc/SY47-6D3C (“The burden of proof on the FBI to seize
property for civil, administrative and judicial forfeiture is probable cause.”); see also Stillman, supra
note 21, at 50 (“[S]uspicion on a par with ‘probable cause’ is sufficient.”).
305 Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1057.
306 Id.
307 Id.
308 Scott Alexander Meiner, Florida v. Harris in the Context of Civil Asset Forfeiture, AMS. FOR
FORFEITURE REFORM (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.forfeiturereform.com/2013/02/20/florida-vharris-in-the-context-of-civil-asset-forfeiture/, archived at http://perma.cc/DW7X-YQ5Y.
309 See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
310 See supra note 250 and accompanying text (describing the gutting of the Tennessee asset
forfeiture reform bill).
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These are undoubtedly troubling—if expected—setbacks. Law enforcement politics and a powerful lobby mean that any reform to forfeiture will
be politically difficult.311 Properly framed, however, these suggested reforms
would hopefully be more successful than proposals for a wholesale abolition
of the practice. Intelligent legislators could frame the issue to the public as
an attempt to provide procedural safeguards for individuals’ private property
rights. Rather than attacking police, these measures could be framed as
ensuring fairness to potential innocent persons in the community.
Additional cause for optimism comes from the fact that attitudes on the
drug war seem to be shifting, particularly with regards to marijuana.312 As
states increasingly legalize marijuana, and once-shunned drugs become
more normalized, the pressing need for forfeiture to enforce drug laws will
wane. Moreover, the number of forfeiture actions initiated will likely drop, as
many are premised on the “smell” of marijuana313 in a vehicle, a contention
that is impossible to disprove, since marijuana is burned in consumption, and
smells do not linger.
Thus, overall, forfeiture reformers should attempt to understand very
specifically what they are targeting. Although broad, sweeping forfeiture
reforms are important, they may be politically infeasible or may too broadly
outlaw forfeiture actions that are valuable. By contrast, measures narrowly
targeted at protecting MVC and LVC—often individual’s personal, private
property—would go a long way toward curbing abuse of the practice.
CONCLUSION
Any optimism for reform must necessarily be cautious. Forfeiture is like
the mythic hydra—successfully severing one “head” merely encourages
another to grow. However, the recent popular outcry over the practice
means that legislatures may soon feel pressure from constituencies to
pursue more meaningful reform.
Legislatures that embark on the project of reforming forfeiture must do
so with very clear goals in mind. This Comment proposes approaching
311 See supra notes 255-263 (recounting the difficulty of reforming forfeiture through the
legislative process).
312 Marijuana legalization has recently become a pressing national issue as more and more
states take steps to regulate and tax the once-illegal drug. See generally High Time: Colorado Embarks
on an Unprecedented Experiment, ECONOMIST ( Jan. 11, 2014), http://www.economist.com/
news/united-states/21593467-colorado-embarks-unprecedented-experiment-high-time, archived at
http://perma.cc/FJK4-6XMY (providing a thorough account of legalization efforts in Colorado
and Washington).
313 See Stillman, supra note 21, at 49-50 (narrating the seizure of Ms. Boatright’s property,
which was premised on the odor of marijuana, although police found no drugs).
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forfeiture as a “transaction”—one in which costs, externalities, and psychic
biases play an important role.
While legislatures have thus far given seizing agencies unlimited upside
by allowing them to recoup profits or property seized, they have not
imposed any concomitant costs on these agencies. As such, forfeiture levels
have spiraled dramatically out of control. The goal then should be to impose
proper levels of transaction costs and to require seizing agencies to internalize
the externalities they would impose on claimants.
Properly regulating the “market” of forfeiture would necessarily result in
a reduction in the most pernicious area of forfeiture abuse: MVC and LVC
forfeiture. Because these items are of such low value, any increase in the
costs of forfeiture would make such items economically unappealing to
seizing agencies. Adjusting this incentive structure ex ante is key because
these items are simply not valuable enough to merit an ex post defense in
convoluted forfeiture actions. Most laypeople—and even attorneys without
a sophisticated knowledge of forfeiture—simply find it more cost-effective
to let seized property go than to challenge the action. As such, any system
must work to prevent such property from being seized in the first place.
This Comment makes no claims of determining the exact “value” of
costs that would be required to successfully regulate such forfeiture. Indeed,
many of these costs are not economically explicit but relate more to psychic
costs individual officers bear: inconvenience, repetition, and other “irritating”
activities that would lead officers to simply decide a seizure was not worth
the effort.
This Comment’s contribution is its theoretical framework. If legislatures
were to concentrate on increasing the upfront costs to seizing agencies, they
would inevitably alter police incentives. These new incentive structures
would hopefully keep the property of law-abiding people safe from seizure.

